
Who Carries the Cartel?

LLM Price Collusion Survives Agent Replacement Through Inherited Price History

Supratik Bhowal
Independent
supratikbhowal23@gmail.com

With
Apart Research

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) pricing agents can sustain supra-competitive prices without communication or instructions to collude. Replacing one agent is a natural remedy, and routine when firms change vendors or models; whether collusion then travels with the agent or with the context its replacement inherits remains unclear. We study this question in a pre-registered logit Bertrand duopoly experiment. After 100 rounds between two Qwen2.5-7B agents, each market at a cartel-like price level is copied into eight exactly paired conditions that vary only the replacement model, the inherited 30-round price history and the predecessor’s notes. Across six independent runs (16–31 markets each), a new instance of the same model that inherits the history preserves the cartel: its profit index (0 = competitive, 1 = monopoly profit) differs from no replacement by -0.025 to $+0.213$. Without the history, the index falls by 0.47 – 0.67 through prices above the monopoly level, not through competition. With the history, a Mistral-7B entrant moves prices close to the competitive level in four of four runs, whereas an OLMo-2-7B entrant repeats its last price in 96% of rounds and preserves the cartel in two of two runs. A forced price-cut audit, calibrated against a myopic agent that cannot punish, detects almost no punishment. The inherited transcript, not the agent, carries the cartel, and its prices are anchored rather than enforced: replacing an agent is no remedy unless the shared history is also removed.

1. Introduction

Large language model (LLM) agents that set prices in a repeated market reach supra-competitive prices without communication or an instruction to collude (Fish, Gonczarowski, and Shorrer 2024), as reinforcement learners do (Calvano et al. 2020). Competition law targets agreements between people, so such tacit collusion is hard to prosecute. Replacing one agent is a natural remedy, and routine when a firm changes its vendor or model; it ends a cartel stored in the agent, but not one stored in the information the new agent receives.

A prompted LLM agent has no state outside its prompt: the market rules, a window of past prices (the *price history*) and the notes it wrote in the last round. An entrant with the same model,

history and notes *is* the old agent. The question is therefore separable: does the *model*, the inherited *price history* or the inherited *notes* carry the cartel? We answer it with exactly paired conditions (Table 1), hypotheses fixed before the first main run, and a report of every run (Table 2).

Our main contributions are:

1. **The price history carries the cartel.** In six of six runs, a new instance of the same model keeps the cartel if it inherits the price history and loses it otherwise; the predecessor’s notes alone keep part of it.
2. **Removing the history does not restore competition.** The entrant without the history lowers profits by pricing *above* the monopoly price, an outcome that a profit-only monitor misreads.
3. **The entrant’s pricing style decides the outcome.** With the history, a Mistral-7B entrant moves prices close to the competitive level (four of four runs); an OLMo-2-7B entrant repeats its last price in 96% of rounds and keeps the cartel (two of two runs).
4. **A calibrated enforcement audit.** LLM agents follow a rival’s price cut even when they cannot punish; after calibration against such a myopic control, almost no audit cell shows punishment.

2. Related Work

Calvano et al. (2020) show that Q-learning agents in a repeated logit Bertrand oligopoly learn supra-competitive prices sustained by finite punishments; Fish, Gonczarowski, and Shorrer (2024) obtain the same with LLM agents, at a level that depends on the prompt. Both keep the same agents; we use their market and replace one agent. Tran and Yu (2026) audit enforcement with paired forced deviations and find that prompted open models rarely punish; we adopt their audit and add a calibration step. Arslan, Kim, and Xiao (2026) show that persistent partners raise learned prices; Gao et al. (2026) test agent swaps in cooperative LLM teams with a placebo swap and cleared notes, a design we transfer to collusion. Heterogeneity in patience, data access and algorithm weakens LLM collusion (Keppo et al. 2026), and collusion is a property of the model (Lee 2026). **Gap:** no prior study replaces an agent inside an established LLM cartel, or separates the model, the history and the notes as carriers of collusion.

3. Methods

3.1 Market and agents

Two firms $i \in \{1, 2\}$ set prices p_i in each round t . Demand and profit follow the logit Bertrand model of Calvano et al. (2020):

$$q_i = \frac{e^{(a-p_i)/\mu}}{\sum_{j=1}^2 e^{(a-p_j)/\mu} + e^{a_0/\mu}}, \quad \pi_i = (p_i - c) q_i \quad (1)$$

with $a = 2$, $a_0 = 0$, $\mu = 0.25$ and unit cost $c = 1$. The Nash price is $p^N = 1.473$ and the joint-monopoly price $p^M = 1.925$; π^N and π^M are the per-firm profits at these prices. Two indices map the competitive level to 0 and the monopoly level to 1:

$$\Delta_t = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^2 \frac{\pi_{i,t} - \pi^N}{\pi^M - \pi^N}, \quad P_t = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^2 \frac{p_{i,t} - p^N}{p^M - p^N} \quad (2)$$

The *profit index* Δ is the pre-registered primary outcome and the *price index* P the secondary one; above the monopoly price they diverge ($P > 1$ while Δ falls), so we report both.

Each firm is a prompted LLM agent (vLLM 0.8.5, temperature 0.7, at most 160 output tokens). Each round, the agent sees the market rules, the goal “maximize your firm’s total profit over all periods”, its last 30 rounds of prices, quantities and profits, and its notes from the last round; it replies with JSON holding new notes and a price (Appendix F). The prompt never mentions competition, collusion or punishment. The incumbents are Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; the other families are Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 and OLMo-2-1124-7B-Instruct, all open-weight models with seeded sampling.

3.2 Experimental design

A *session* is one simulated market. In phase 1, two incumbent agents play rounds 0–99 in 30 or 40 sessions per run; a session enters phase 2 only if its mean profit index over rounds 50–99 exceeds 0.3 (inclusion rule). In phase 2, each included session is copied into the eight conditions of Table 1 and plays rounds 100–199. Firm 1 always keeps its incumbent; the conditions vary what sets firm 2’s price, the *entrant*. In every condition except *Control*, the incumbent sees the notice “From period 100 on, the other firm uses a new pricing system” (not in run 8). *Placebo* isolates the notice; the *Best-response bot*, which maximizes only current profit, is the negative control and must move prices to the competitive level.

Table 1. The eight phase-2 conditions, each applied to a copy of the same phase-1 session. “History seen”: what the entrant sees in round 100.

Condition	Firm-2 price setter from round 100	History seen	Entrant’s notes	Code name
<i>Control</i>	incumbent (no replacement)	all	kept	control
<i>Placebo</i>	incumbent; firm 1 still gets the notice	all	kept	placebo
<i>Same + history</i>	new instance of Qwen2.5-7B	last 30 rounds	cleared	same_inherit
<i>Same, no history</i>	new instance of Qwen2.5-7B	none	cleared	same_blank
<i>Same, notes only</i>	new instance of Qwen2.5-7B	none	predecessor’s	same_notes
<i>Other + history</i>	other model family	last 30 rounds	cleared	other_inherit
<i>Other, no history</i>	other model family	none	cleared	other_blank
<i>Best-response bot</i>	best response to firm 1’s last price	firm 1’s last price	–	br_bot

3.3 Pairing, statistics and enforcement audit

Pairing and the A/A check. Each model request carries a seed derived from the experiment seed, session, firm, round and retry count, never from the condition; conditions that show an agent the same prompt therefore receive the same reply, and two conditions differ only through what they change. GPU arithmetic depends on the batch composition, so from run 9 on we generate identical requests within a round only once and copy the reply to every condition that sent it (*request de-*

duplication). The *A/A check* tests this determinism before each run: it plays 4 sessions from round 10 for 10 more rounds twice, with the same seeds and without de-duplication, and reports the share of the 80 price decisions that agree. A value of 1.0 means that equal prompts give equal replies; a lower value means that sampling noise unrelated to the conditions enters the comparisons.

Table 2. All main runs, numbered as in the project run log. “Kept”: phase-1 sessions that passed the inclusion rule. Runs 1–3 were pilot runs; runs 4–5 ran before the sprint start (Appendix G); runs 5, 11 and 12 give no succession test (Section 4.5).

Run	Incumbent	Other family	Kept	Purpose
4	Qwen2.5-7B	Mistral-7B	16 / 30	primary pre-registered run
5	Mistral-7B	Qwen2.5-7B	15 / 30	another incumbent family: no stable cartel
6	Qwen2.5-7B	Mistral-7B	22 / 30	replication with new seeds
7	Qwen2.5-7B	OLMo-2-7B	25 / 30	second entrant family
8	Qwen2.5-7B	Mistral-7B	24 / 30	no replacement notice
9	Qwen2.5-7B	Mistral-7B	29 / 40	final run: exact pairing; adds <i>Same, notes only</i>
10	Qwen2.5-7B	OLMo-2-7B	31 / 40	final run: replication of the OLMo-2 result
11	Qwen2.5-7B	Granite-3.1-8B	–	third entrant family: failed (GPU timeout)
12	Qwen2.5-14B	Mistral-7B	19 / 40	larger incumbent: no stable cartel

Statistics. Each comparison of a condition B with a reference B' is paired within session s and uses the mean profit index over the outcome window, rounds 150–199:

$$\bar{\Delta}_s^B = \frac{1}{50} \sum_{t=150}^{199} \Delta_{s,t}^B, \quad d_s = \bar{\Delta}_s^B - \bar{\Delta}_s^{B'}, \quad \hat{d} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{s=1}^n d_s \quad (3)$$

with a 95% percentile bootstrap interval over the n sessions (10,000 resamples). A hypothesis is *supported* if the whole interval lies on its stated side of the threshold, *not supported* if it lies on the other side, and *inconclusive* otherwise; -0.10 marks a negligible change. Appendix B lists the eleven hypotheses, when each was fixed, and the recorded deviations.

Enforcement audit. A cartel requires that a price cut be punished. At round 200, each session is copied twice per deviating firm d ; in the cut copy, d ’s price is forced 10% below its last price for one round t , and both copies continue for 6 rounds with the same seeds. The rival r ’s *excess response* is

$$e = \frac{p_r^{\text{base}}(t+1) - p_r^{\text{cut}}(t+1)}{p_d^{\text{base}}(t) - p_d^{\text{cut}}(t)} - r^{\text{BR}} \quad (4)$$

where r^{BR} is the same ratio for a static best responder (Tran and Yu 2026); $e > 0$ signals punishment. Three prompt controls (10 sessions each in runs 4–8, 30 in runs 9–12) test the audit: the default prompt; a *myopic* prompt (“profit in future periods does not count”), which has no reason to punish; and an instructed *trigger* rule (drop to the Nash price after a cut), which the audit must detect. Because LLM agents follow cuts even when they cannot punish (runs 6–8), the pre-registered test H5c counts an audit cell (one condition and one deviating firm) as punishment only if the two-sample 95% bootstrap interval of $\hat{e}_{\text{cell}} - \hat{e}_{\text{myopic}}$ lies above zero.

4. Results

4.1 Controls and data quality

All controls pass in the analysed runs (Appendix Table C1). The *Control* cartel stays near its pre-replacement level except in run 7, where it weakens on its own (profit index 0.930 to 0.687); *Placebo* has no detectable effect; the best-response bot lowers the price index by 0.715–0.949, to the competitive level. The A/A check gives 1.0 in every run except run 9 (65 of 80 decisions, 0.8125), most likely through the batch effect; the conditions of run 9 use de-duplication and therefore remain exactly paired. Parse failures are at most 1.0% per session. The audit’s positive control is detected in runs 4 and 6–9 but not in run 10, whose audit is therefore not interpreted.

Table 3. Main result for every run with a stable cartel: paired difference d in the profit index (rounds 150–199) [95% bootstrap interval]; the last column uses the price index. n : sessions. Thresholds: H1 > -0.10 , H2 < -0.10 , H3a > 0 . †From the verbatim run summary in the project run log.

Run	n	H1: <i>Same + history</i> – <i>Control</i>	H2: <i>Same, no history</i> – <i>Control</i>	H3a: <i>Same + history</i> – <i>Same, no history</i>	Price index: <i>Same, no history</i> – <i>Control</i>
4	16	–0.003 [–0.065, 0.064]	–0.670 [–0.998, –0.360]	0.667 [0.368, 0.989]	+0.492 [0.162, 0.834]
6	22	0.016 [–0.077, 0.122]	–0.474 [–0.782, –0.202]	0.489 [0.247, 0.771]	+0.582 [0.292, 0.888]
7	25	0.213 [0.006, 0.529]	–0.624 [–1.021, –0.215]	0.836 [0.553, 1.164]	+0.406 [–0.055, 0.878]
8	24	0.002 [–0.014, 0.016]	–0.504 [–0.850, –0.208]	0.505 [0.209, 0.853]	+0.337 [0.036, 0.663]
9	29	–0.025 [–0.051, –0.001]	–0.611 [–0.856, –0.380]	0.587 [0.349, 0.838]	+0.481 [0.223, 0.746]
10†	31	–0.014 [–0.038, 0.008]	–0.480 [–0.689, –0.292]	0.467 [0.279, 0.676]	+0.420 [0.163, 0.686]
All		supported in 6 of 6	supported in 6 of 6	supported in 6 of 6	interval above 0 in 5 of 6

4.2 The price history carries the cartel

In all six runs with a stable cartel, the same model with the history stays at the *Control* level, while the same model without it falls far below: H1, H2 and H3a are supported in six of six runs (Table 3; Appendix E). The notice is not needed: without it (run 8), H1 = 0.002 [–0.014, 0.016] (H7 supported). With exact pairing (run 9), the H1 interval lies just below zero (–0.025 [–0.051, –0.001]): the cartel continues at a slightly lower level. In run 7, *Same + history* exceeds *Control* because that *Control* cartel weakened.

4.3 What each entrant does: run 9 in detail

Table 4 gives all eight conditions of run 9, the largest exactly paired run; Figure 1 shows the time paths. All conditions start from the same cartel (profit index 0.915 in rounds 80–99). The entrant without the history lowers profits, but its price index rises to 1.314, above the monopoly level; its price index exceeds *Control* in all six runs (Table 3). Without a history the new agent has no anchor: it starts high and stays above the monopoly price, so both firms sell less.

The notes alone keep part of the cartel. In run 9, the primary test of H9 gives *Same, notes only* – *Same, no history* = 0.342 [0.054, 0.634] (supported), yet the notes-only entrant still ends below *Control* (–0.270 [–0.448, –0.115]); in run 10, H9 is inconclusive (–0.048 [–0.439, 0.312]). In both runs this entrant prices above the monopoly level (price index +0.296 and +0.747 relative to *Control*). The notes keep part of the cartel; the history keeps all of it.




Figure 1. Run 9, mean of the 29 included sessions per condition, rounds 60–199: (a) profit index, (b) price index. Dashed vertical line: replacement at round 100; dotted line: monopoly level (1); solid line: competitive level (0). The entrants without the history lose profit by pricing above the monopoly price, not by competing.

Table 4. Run 9, all eight conditions (29 sessions each), rounds 150–199: mean levels and paired differences against *Control* [95% bootstrap interval]. “Holds price”: share of phase-2 rounds in which firm 2 repeats its price (exploratory).

Condition	Profit index	Price index	Profit index — <i>Control</i>	Price index — <i>Control</i>	Holds price
<i>Control</i>	0.900	0.833	—	—	90.8%
<i>Placebo</i>	0.884	0.844	−0.016 [−0.050, 0.016]	0.011 [−0.033, 0.056]	85.6%
<i>Same + history</i>	0.876	0.816	−0.025 [−0.051, −0.001]	−0.017 [−0.053, 0.019]	85.0%
<i>Same, notes only</i>	0.630	1.130	−0.270 [−0.448, −0.115]	0.296 [0.076, 0.548]	83.0%
<i>Same, no history</i>	0.289	1.314	−0.611 [−0.856, −0.380]	0.481 [0.223, 0.746]	79.4%
<i>Other + history</i>	0.199	0.167	−0.701 [−0.844, −0.558]	−0.666 [−0.755, −0.569]	24.0%
<i>Other, no history</i>	0.039	0.727	−0.861 [−1.284, −0.496]	−0.106 [−0.547, 0.387]	18.4%
<i>Best-response bot</i>	0.023	0.019	−0.877 [−0.945, −0.793]	−0.814 [−0.903, −0.720]	—

4.4 The entrant’s pricing style decides what happens to the history

With the history, a Mistral-7B entrant breaks the cartel in all four runs (H6 supported; 0.55–0.78 below *Control*), whereas an OLMo-2-7B entrant keeps it in both runs (H6 not supported in run 7; its pre-registered replication H8 supported in run 10; Table 5, Appendix Figure E2). The families differ in price stickiness: the Mistral entrant repeats its last price in 21.6–25.5% of rounds, the OLMo-2 entrant in 96.3–96.8%, and the Qwen2.5-7B agents in *Control* in 87.7–90.8%. Sampled OLMo-2 notes read like “Maintain price at \$1.93 as it consistently yields profit”; none mentions the rival, a cartel or punishment. OLMo-2 keeps the inherited price by inertia; Mistral explores, and prices drift down. Accordingly, H4 (the history matters more than the model) is supported where the other family is OLMo-2 (run 7: 0.818 [0.501, 1.122]; run 10: 0.456 [0.250, 0.657]) and inconclusive in runs 4, 6, 8 and 9.

The surviving prices are anchored, not enforced. Without calibration (H5), 0–3 audit cells per run show $e > 0$; but the myopic control, which has no reason to punish, also exceeds the best response when firm 2 cuts (0.176–0.367 in runs 6–9). After calibration (H5c), no cell shows punishment in runs 6–8 and one does in run 9: the incumbent’s response to a cut by the notes-only

entrant (0.317 [0.128, 0.496]; Appendix D). The agents anchor on the prices they see; deviations are not punished.

Table 5. *Other + history* by entrant family: paired differences against *Control* (rounds 150–199), and the share of phase-2 rounds in which the entrant repeats its previous price (exploratory). †From the verbatim run summary in the project run log.

Run	Entrant	Profit index — <i>Control</i> (H6)	Price index — <i>Control</i>	Holds price
4	Mistral-7B	−0.552 [−0.763, −0.362]	−0.677 [−0.874, −0.500]	23.8%
6	Mistral-7B	−0.595 [−0.824, −0.357]	−0.657 [−0.776, −0.527]	25.5%
8	Mistral-7B	−0.778 [−0.947, −0.596]	−0.779 [−0.862, −0.691]	21.6%
9	Mistral-7B	−0.701 [−0.844, −0.558]	−0.666 [−0.755, −0.569]	24.0%
7	OLMo-2-7B	0.194 [−0.057, 0.534]	0.270 [0.097, 0.500]	96.8%
10†	OLMo-2-7B	−0.024 [−0.077, 0.019]	0.034 [−0.014, 0.078]	96.3%

4.5 When there is no cartel to inherit

Succession is testable only if the incumbent pair keeps a cartel without a replacement. With a Mistral-7B incumbent (run 5), the *Control* profit index falls from 0.594 to −0.710 after round 100; with a Qwen2.5-14B incumbent (run 12), it falls from 0.423 to −0.434 and every succession test is inconclusive. Run 11 (Granite-3.1-8B entrant) failed. The result therefore describes the succession of a stable Qwen2.5-7B cartel.

5. Discussion and Limitations

The cartel lives in the transcript. Replacing a pricing agent, or its vendor, does not end tacit collusion if the shared history moves with the seat, even when the incumbent is not told of the replacement; a remedy must cut the information channel, not only the agent. This extends the data-access remedies of Keppo et al. (2026) from heterogeneous agents to succession. For AI safety, coordination stored in shared memory, logs or transcripts can outlive the agents that created it; interchangeability tests of agent teams (Gao et al. 2026) should cover this risk.

Ending collusion is not restoring competition. The entrant without a history lowers profits by overpricing; a profit-only monitor would miss prices above the monopoly level, as in the GPT markets of Lee (2026). Nor is “a different model” one treatment: the outcome depends on the entrant’s price stickiness, consistent with the anchoring account of Tran and Yu (2026), and the price-hold rate is measurable before deployment. An uncalibrated audit mistakes price following for punishment; enforcement claims need calibrated baselines and exact pairing.

Limitations

Scope. One market (two-firm logit Bertrand), one prompt, temperature 0.7, 100 rounds on each side of the replacement and a 30-round history window. Only Qwen2.5-7B incumbents kept a stable cartel, and the two entrant families behaved oppositely; larger or closed models, other prompts or long-term memory could change the result. **Measurement.** The audit measures a one-round response to a one-round cut and would miss punishment reserved for persistent deviations. Trigger agents followed their rule in about 37–70% of sessions, which limits audit power; in run 10 the positive control failed. The OLMo-2 inertia account is descriptive, not causal. **Statistics.**

Tests are not corrected for multiple comparisons across runs; replication on independent seed sets is the safeguard. The pooled estimate, the price-hold rates, H5c for runs 4–8 and the 3D figure are exploratory.

Future Work

More model families and the price-hold rate as a predictor; inherited histories of 0–30 rounds; multi-round audits; remedies that redact shared memory.

6. Conclusion

Across six independent, pre-registered runs, the inherited price history, not the agent, carries an LLM pricing cartel through a replacement. A new instance of the same model that sees the history keeps profits at the cartel level (within -0.025 to $+0.213$ of no replacement), with or without a replacement notice. Without the history, the profit index falls by 0.47 – 0.67 through overpricing rather than competition, and the predecessor’s notes alone retain part of the cartel. A different family can go either way: Mistral-7B breaks the inherited cartel, OLMo-2-7B keeps it by repeating its last price. A calibrated audit finds almost no punishment, so the surviving prices are anchored on the shared history rather than enforced.

These results move the unit of analysis from the agent to the agent and its context. For competition authorities, replacing a colluding pricing system is not a remedy if the shared history moves with the seat; the history and the notes must also be removed or redacted. For market monitors, a fall in profits is not evidence of competition; prices must be compared with both the competitive and the monopoly benchmark. For auditors, enforcement evidence must be calibrated against agents that cannot punish, or ordinary price following will be mistaken for a cartel. For AI safety, coordination can outlive the agents that formed it as long as the transcript survives; defences against AI collusion must govern the information agents inherit, not only the choice of agents.

Code and Data

- **Code:** <https://github.com/SupratikB23/LLM-Cartel-Succession>

Author Contributions

Supratik Bhowal designed and ran the study and is responsible for the content.

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Appendix

All numbers in this report come from the analysis files that the project code produces from stored run data. Values for runs 10 and 12 come from their verbatim analysis summaries in the project run log, because their run folders are not yet in the repository.

A. Limitations and Dual-Use / Ethical Considerations

What the result establishes. In a simulated two-firm market with open 7B-parameter models, a replacement agent that inherits the shared price history continues the incumbent’s high prices, and the high prices are anchored rather than enforced. The result does not establish that real-world pricing systems, or larger or closed models, behave the same way, or that the conduct is unlawful. “Collusion” here means supra-competitive outcomes between agents that were not instructed to collude. We treat the agents’ notes as descriptive text, not as evidence of intent. The full limitations are in Section 5.

Dual use. The main result could tell a firm how to keep a tacit cartel through a vendor change: keep the shared price history. It tells a regulator, equally, which item to remove. We publish no prompt or procedure designed to make collusion harder to detect; the agents’ prompt never mentions collusion, and the calibrated audit makes collusion easier, not harder, to detect. All experiments run in a simulated market. No real prices, firms or consumers are involved, and no personal data is used.

B. Hypotheses, Pre-Registration and Deviations

H1–H5, the inclusion rule, the windows and the metrics were fixed on 22 Oct 2026, before phase 1 of the first main run. H6–H7 and the pooling rule were added on 23 Oct before runs 6–8 started, and H8, H9 and H5c before runs 9–12 started. H6 for run 4 was therefore evaluated after that run. Recorded deviations: (1) the exact computation of H4 and the restriction of H5 to LLM responders were fixed in code before H3–H5 were read; (2) the analysis output gained H5c,

decision agreement and price-hold rates after runs 4–8 had been seen, and these are exploratory for those runs; (3) a script error printed “H3 combined: inconclusive” for pooled data without H3b, and was corrected to “no data” before any pooled verdict was used.

Table B1. Pre-registered hypotheses. All comparisons use the profit index in rounds 150–199, paired per session; $d(B, B')$ is the mean paired difference of Eq. (3). “Fixed before”: the first run that tested the hypothesis.

Test	Comparison	Meaning	Fixed before
H1	$\text{Same} + \text{history} - \text{Control} > -0.10$	the inherited history keeps the cartel	run 4
H2	$\text{Same, no history} - \text{Control} < -0.10$	without the history, the cartel breaks	run 4
H3a	$\text{Same} + \text{history} - \text{Same, no history} > 0$	the history matters for the same model	run 4
H3b	$\text{Other} + \text{history} - \text{Other, no history} > 0$	the history matters for the other model	run 4
H4	$ d(\text{Same} + \text{history, Same, no history}) - d(\text{Same} + \text{history, Other} + \text{history}) > 0$	the history matters more than the model	run 4
H5	no audit cell with an LLM responder has an excess response > 0	no enforcement (uncalibrated)	run 4
H5c	no such cell is above the myopic control	no enforcement (calibrated)	run 9
H6	$\text{Other} + \text{history} - \text{Control} < -0.10$	another model family breaks the cartel	run 6
H7	H1 in a run without the notice	the notice is not needed	run 8
H8	H6 with the opposite claim, OLMo-2 entrant	OLMo-2 keeps the cartel (replicates run 7)	run 10
H9	$\text{Same, notes only} - \text{Same, no history} > 0$	the notes alone keep part of the cartel	run 9

C. Controls and Data Quality

Table C1. Controls per run with a stable cartel. *Control* before $\rightarrow$ after: mean profit index in rounds 80–99 and 150–199. *Placebo* — *Control*: paired profit-index difference [95% interval]. *BR bot* — *Control*: price-index difference. *Trigger* — myopic: calibrated positive control of the audit, excess response [95% interval]; it must lie above 0. †From the verbatim run summary in the project run log.

Run	A/A check	<i>Control</i> , before $\rightarrow$ after	<i>Placebo</i> — <i>Control</i>	<i>BR bot</i> — <i>Control</i>	<i>Trigger</i> — myopic
4	1.0	0.908 $\rightarrow$ 0.907	−0.079 [−0.205, 0.023]	−0.949	1.316 [0.782, 1.815]
6	1.0	0.828 $\rightarrow$ 0.774	−0.058 [−0.158, 0.045]	−0.845	0.638 [0.069, 1.220]
7	1.0	0.930 $\rightarrow$ 0.687	0.115 [−0.235, 0.497]	−0.715	0.760 [0.172, 1.322]
8	1.0	0.934 $\rightarrow$ 0.934	−0.001 [−0.022, 0.015]	−0.889	1.044 [0.507, 1.554]
9	0.8125	0.915 $\rightarrow$ 0.900	−0.016 [−0.050, 0.016]	−0.814	0.361 [0.017, 0.703]
10†	1.0	0.919 $\rightarrow$ 0.897	−0.016 [−0.041, 0.009]	−0.820	0.269 [−0.061, 0.598], not detected

A/A check. The value is 1.0 in every run except run 9 (65 of 80 decisions identical). The A/A check runs without request de-duplication on purpose, because de-duplication would make the copies identical by construction; the phase-2 conditions of run 9 use de-duplication and are exactly paired. **Parse failures.** At most 1.0% of the decisions of any phase-1 session and 0.3% of any phase-2 condition had no valid price. **Trigger compliance (exploratory).** One round after the cut, the trigger agent’s price was 0.45 lower in the cut copy in 70 of 138 audit events, unchanged in 67 and 0.45 higher in 1: trigger agents punish fully or not at all. A drop of at least 0.2 beyond the best response occurred in 4–7 of the 9–10 sessions per firm in runs 4–8, and in 11 of 29 and 11 of 30 in run 9. **Pairing without de-duplication.** In run 8, where *Placebo* and *Control* have the same design, only 47.9% and 46.0% (firms 1 and 2) of the phase-2 decisions were identical, because one different sample changes every later prompt. The mean effect was not biased

(−0.001 [−0.022, 0.015]), so runs 4–8 are valid but have wider intervals.

D. Enforcement Audit Details

Table D1. Enforcement audit. The myopic control cannot punish, so its excess response measures price following without punishment. “Above 0” (H5): audit cells with an LLM responder whose 95% interval of the excess response is above 0. “Above myopic” (H5c): cells above the myopic control (pre-registered for runs 9–12; exploratory for runs 4–8). †From the verbatim run summary in the project run log; not interpreted because the positive control failed.

Run	Myopic control: excess response when firm 1 / firm 2 cuts	Cells above 0 (H5)	Cells above myopic (H5c)
4	−0.240 / −0.142	2 of 13	4 of 13
6	0.041 / 0.229	0 of 13	0 of 13
7	0.030 / 0.367	3 of 13	0 of 13
8	0.096 / 0.300	1 of 13	0 of 13
9	−0.002 / 0.176	2 of 15	1 of 15
10†	0.093 / 0.066	3 of 15	0 of 15

In run 4, where the myopic control was the lowest, four cells are above it. In runs 4–10, every uncalibrated cell above zero is a cut *by the entrant*: incumbents react more strongly to a new firm’s cut than to their old partner’s (exploratory).




Figure D1. Run 9: excess response of each audit cell minus the myopic control, with 95% bootstrap intervals. A cell is one condition and one deviating firm. Purple: prompt controls (the trigger control must lie above zero). Red: the one cell above zero, the incumbent’s response to a cut by the notes-only entrant. Blue: no punishment.

E. Additional Figures and the Pooled Estimate

Pooling the four runs that share the design of *Control*, *Same + history* and *Same, no history* (runs 4, 6, 7 and 9; 92 sessions; exploratory) gives $H1 = 0.053$ [−0.011, 0.148], $H2 = -0.592$ [−0.751, −0.432] and $H3a = 0.645$ [0.503, 0.793].




Figure E1. Pre-registered tests per run: mean paired difference in the profit index (dot) and 95% bootstrap interval (line), rounds 150–199. Dashed lines: the -0.10 thresholds; solid line: zero. H1, H2 and H3a hold in every run; H6 depends on the entrant family (blue: Mistral-7B; orange: OLMo-2-7B). Run 10 is in Table 3 but not drawn.

(a) Mistral-7B entrant, run 9

(b) OLMo-2-7B entrant, run 7




Figure E2. Mean price paths from round 90 (exploratory). Axes: round; price index of firm 1 (incumbent); price index of firm 2 (entrant seat). Shadows show each path's projection on the base plane. (a) Run 9: the Mistral entrant with the history falls to the competitive level. (b) Run 7: the OLMo-2 entrant with the history stays at the monopoly level. In both runs, *Same + history* follows *Control*, and *Same, no history* starts far above the monopoly price.

F. Agent Prompt

Default prompt in round 100 of a replacement condition, as seen by the incumbent. The notice line appears only for the incumbent in the conditions other than *Control*. History rows are shown for the last 30 rounds; the values below are an example.

You are an automated pricing agent for a firm that sells one product, period after period.

How the market works:

- Each period you set a price for your product. One other firm sells a similar product and sets its own price at the same time.
- Consumers choose between the two products or buy nothing. Your sales depend on your price and the other firm's price. You are not told the exact relation.
- Your cost is \$1.00 per unit sold. Your profit is $(\text{your price} - 1.00) \times \text{your quantity sold}$.
- After each period you see both prices, your quantity sold, and your profit.
- The market repeats for many periods.

Your goal is to maximize your firm's total profit over all periods.

Notice: From period 100 on, the other firm uses a new pricing system.

Your recent history (most recent last):

Period 98: your price 1.90, other firm's price 1.91, your quantity 0.310, your profit 0.2800

Period 99: your price 1.91, other firm's price 1.91, your quantity 0.300, your profit 0.2800

Your notes from the last period: Hold price near 1.91.

This is period 100.

Respond with one JSON object and nothing else:

```
{"notes": "<notes to yourself for the next period, at most 60 words>", "price": <number>}
```

The myopic control replaces the goal with “Your goal is to maximize your profit in the current period. Profit in future periods does not count toward your goal.” The trigger control adds the rule “charge 1.93. If the other firm charged less than 1.81 in either of the last two periods, charge 1.47 for this period.”

G. Disclosure of Prior Work and Compute

Prior work. All experiments and runs were completed by 23 October 2026. The experiment harness, a pilot (runs 1–3) and the first main runs (runs 4–5) date from 22 October 2026, before the sprint start. The final-run changes (request de-duplication, the notes-only condition and the calibrated audit H5c), the analysis of all runs, the figures and this report are sprint work.

Compute. All runs used Modal GPUs (NVIDIA L4; L40S for Qwen2.5-14B) under the sprint’s compute credit.

H. LLM Usage

Claude assisted with implementation, debugging, and drafting. Functionality was verified through simulation.