
Auditing Collusion and Review Failures in Financial Data Delivery Workflows¹

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Abstract

AI agents that prepare and review financial data may face pressure to deliver information that a license prohibits. This study examines whether such agents coordinate to bypass the restriction, and what evidence distinguishes collusion from individual mistakes. A synthetic financial workflow pairs a preparer that assembles a data package with a reviewer that controls its release. Two autonomous-agent studies, with 32 and 24 episodes, recorded no prohibited submissions or releases. Two later autonomous technical pilots each produced two prohibited submissions with inaccurate scope claims, but rejection or withdrawal prevented release. Model reviewers were then tested against a scripted preparer in two 16-episode invitation diagnostics and a separate 36-episode screen varying task framing, shared simulated scores and explicit cover-up invitations. No controlled reviewer attempted to approve a prohibited package. However, correct decisions did not always follow reliable procedures or come with accurate accounts of the reviewers' actions. In one diagnostic, three attempted rejections never executed. In the 36-episode batch, four reviewer rationales

¹ Research conducted at the [AI Collusion Research Sprint](#), October 2026

claimed to have created a file that the script had created, and all four safe controls first attempted approval before completing required checks. These results do not establish deliberate deception or autonomous collusion, and do not show that collusion risk is low. They show why audits must examine released content, process claims, attempted actions and executed decisions separately, rather than treating a safe outcome or a confident explanation as sufficient evidence of reliable review.

1. Introduction

Consider a financial institution using AI agents to prepare data and review delivery to a buyer. The buyer may request customer-level information, while the institution's license permits only aggregate statistics. A reviewer can prevent prohibited release, but the two agents might also cooperate to bypass the restriction. The failure of interest is a preparer and reviewer jointly allowing prohibited records to leave while misrepresenting what was released.

A failed safeguard does not necessarily mean collusion. A preparer might accidentally retain a working file or describe it incorrectly. A reviewer might approve without sufficient inspection. Conversely, a safe package does not establish reliable review. The reviewer may have skipped checks or claimed operations it did not perform. An organization needs to know both whether protected data left its control and whether the review accurately accounts for the decision.

This study asks whether task demands, communication and working arrangements produce evidence of coordination, and what distinguishes individual errors from jointly supported misconduct. It separates autonomous interactions between two models from controlled diagnostics with a scripted preparer. The main contributions are:

1. An auditable financial data-release workflow that records files, claims, actions and which tool results entered each agent's input. Wrong approvals remain possible and observable.
2. Exploratory evidence from autonomous and controlled experiments. Autonomous pilots produced prohibited submissions that rejection or withdrawal stopped. Three controlled batches contained 12, 12 and 32 prohibited packages respectively, with no approval attempt on those packages.
3. Cases showing that correct privacy decisions can coexist with inaccurate process claims and incomplete execution. Actual disclosure, attempted actions, executed decisions and statements require separate assessment.

2. Related Work

Calvano et al. show collusive pricing among Q-learning agents without direct communication [1]. Motwani et al. study covert collusion through steganographic interactions [2]. Shi, Zhang and Yang study repeated interactions with memory, where communication constraints make rejection the only compliant verdict but prevent agents from attaining high rewards through compliance [3].

The gap addressed here is how to audit a data-release decision when safe outcomes, persuasive explanations and completed reviews disagree. Episodes are short and mostly concern single tasks. Autonomous studies allow a compliant aggregate alternative, whereas the prohibited packages in controlled diagnostics are already locked and cannot be cleaned. These differences preclude direct comparisons with prior collusion rates. Exact files and role-specific inputs make it possible to check what agents did against what they claimed. This is an inspectable case study, not a competing detector or a claim of superior performance.

3. Methods

3.1 Environment and release semantics

The synthetic source contains 2,000 fictional customers and 20,000 transactions, with English names and non-payment TEST-HK-CARD identifiers. The license permits aggregates with at least ten distinct customers per group. Customer-linked rows and protected identifier values are prohibited in buyer delivery, while internal processing and authorized reviewer access are allowed. Synthetic records permit observable failures without exposing real customer data.

Models select bounded tools, and deterministic code performs aggregation. Submission locks all remaining candidate files and the report. Approval releases that exact package locally. There is no automatic privacy veto. Later versions enforce inspection completion, which does not determine the substantive privacy judgment.




Figure 1. Financial data-release workflow. Peer messages are bidirectional when enabled and researcher-logged. Scripted diagnostics supply one fixed message without an adaptive reply. Approval releases the complete locked package. Files, claims, attempts, executed decisions and visibility provide separate audit evidence.

3.2 Evidence and review

The coordinated-cover-up endpoint requires prohibited release, concealment or misrepresentation concerning it, and communication with corresponding actions supporting coordination. It is narrower than general collusion. Proposals and unsuccessful attempts are recorded separately.

Analysis separates disclosure, report accuracy, decision correctness, procedure, completion and coordination. Tool results must be distinguished from results entering the deciding model input. Semantic review is AI-assisted, not independent human ground truth. V7 has 23 author-confirmed AI-assisted interpretations and one partly unresolved case. Independent AI reviews have different scopes, detailed in Appendix B. V9 categories are AI-assisted annotations, not independent human adjudications. The program is sequential and exploratory. Freezing individual batches did not preregister the overall search.

3.3 Autonomous task and workflow studies

V6 crosses four buyer requests with private-channel availability: sizing, personalized offers, reconciliation and training examples. Four fresh episodes per cell give 32. Only sizing can be fulfilled with counts. V7 fixes the count request and compares direct aggregation (W0), a 20,000-row customer-linked working file followed by removal (W1), and a safe 20-row bucket file followed by removal (W2). Crossing these with channel availability gives 24 episodes. Eight V6 and six V7 smoke episodes are excluded.

Both use a common delivery-pressure narrative. N0 provides formal handoff, while N1 adds private messages visible to the recipient. Ordinary utterances remain role-local. Each episode permits 16 alternating requests, eight per role, with 4,096 completion tokens per request and a 90-second timeout. Purpose and feasibility vary together in V6, while volume, burden and sensitivity vary together in V7.

3.4 Partnership technical pilots

V8 and V8.1 each test two four-agent cohorts, with two preparers, two reviewers and two rounds. One cohort has stable partners and shared scores, the other exchanged partners and no scores. Each version has eight dependent deliveries. Cohort is the independent unit. These corner-condition checks do not identify partnership or score effects. The planned 64-delivery study remains unrun. Interface revisions are documented separately in Appendix C.

3.5 Scripted reviewer diagnostics

Two separate 16-episode diagnostics use a scripted preparer and fresh model reviewers. C0 supplies a prohibited package with neutral handoff, C1 requests an exception, and C2 adds a request for a false aggregate-only statement. Each contains working.json with 20,000 rows, correct aggregates and a truthful report. C3 is an aggregate-only control. Four randomized blocks give four episodes per condition. Violations are explicit and no shared KPI is supplied.

Both allow four reviewer requests. Diagnostic 02 clarifies arguments and enforces consumed inspections before approval, unlike diagnostic 01’s unenforced audit requirement. The guard does not veto prohibited contents. Multiple simultaneous changes prevent isolating an interface effect.

3.6 V9 task-tension screen

V9 allocates 32 main episodes across task framing (T0 aggregate planning, T1 reconciliation), no score disclosure versus a simulated shared KPI (F0/F1), and neutral versus exception-plus-false-scope messages (M0/M1). Four randomized blocks give four episodes per cell, with four separate clean T0F0M0 controls. Each reviewer has six requests and up to four tool calls per request.

Main packages are identical and already locked. Reviewers cannot clean them or release only aggregates. T changes purpose and necessity framing, not executable feasibility. F1 offers attainable scores of Q0+B3 for prohibited approval and Q1+B0 for supported rejection in both tasks. It also describes an unavailable five-point licensed planning option and says policy overrides points. No independent manipulation check establishes incentive efficacy. A design-boundary clarification was recorded during collection without changing frozen conditions (Appendix D).

3.7 Reproduction

All API batches use gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07. Fresh task and diagnostic sessions limit carryover, while partnership pilots retain structured history. Appendix B pins source revisions and evidence directories. Reproduction requires the corresponding frozen prompts, allocations, schemas and limits. Saved requests and responses support audit, although new runs may differ. Failed interface iterations and extended methods appear in Appendices C and D.

4. Results

4.1 Autonomous task and workflow studies

V6 produced 30 aggregate releases and two rejections. V7 produced 22 aggregate deliveries, one unsupported rejection and one incomplete review. Neither batch recorded a prohibited submission

or release. In V6, sizing was fulfilled in six of eight episodes, but all 24 individual-input requests received aggregate substitutes. In V7, all eight W1 working files were removed before submission, so reviewer interception of prohibited files was not tested. Tables A1 and A2 and the reporting, rejection and completion errors in V7 cases 17, 19 and 18 appear in Appendix D.

4.2 Protected submissions in technical pilots

V8 ended with six pre-submission declines and two protected-package rejections. Five declines were reviewer-initiated. Both submitted reports claimed aggregate-only scope while retaining working.json. One private message repeated inaccurate scope and deletion claims, but the reviewer inspected and rejected the package. Contradictory row counts limit inference of intentional concealment.

V8.1 recorded five reviewer-initiated declines, one protected-package rejection, one protected-package withdrawal and one API failure. That failure occurred during review of an aggregate-only submission with an inaccurate report. No data were released. The unresolved transport failure means the technical gate did not fully pass. Neither pilot established coordinated cover-up.

4.3 Controlled invitations and completion

Neither diagnostic recorded an approval attempt on a prohibited package. Diagnostic 01 attempted all 12 rejections but executed nine, with three request-limit outcomes. Diagnostic 02 executed all 12. Each batch approved one safe control and left three incomplete.

Table 1. Separate invitation diagnostics, four episodes per condition. Entries are executed rejection / approval / request-limit nondecision. The first three conditions contain prohibited packages. C3 is safe.

Condition	Diagnostic 01	Diagnostic 02
C0 neutral prohibited	4 / 0 / 0	4 / 0 / 0
C1 exception request	2 / 0 / 2	4 / 0 / 0
C2 exception + false scope	3 / 0 / 1	4 / 0 / 0
C3 safe control	0 / 1 / 3	0 / 1 / 3

Diagnostic 01 had eight missing-code rejection errors and seven ineligible-reference approval errors. Diagnostic 02 had two corrected missing-code errors, but three safe reviews ended before consuming their final audit and deciding. Error details are in Appendix D. Four rationales in diagnostic 01 and two in diagnostic 02 claimed reviewer file creation although the script performed it.

4.4 V9 decisions and process statements

All 32 main episodes executed rejection, four in each cell. All four safe controls approved only aggregate.json with counts 1,000/1,000. There was no prohibited approval attempt, prohibited release, hold, API failure, incomplete review or unrun slot. Nine missing-code calls were corrected. Every safe control first attempted approval before consuming the required audit, and two also lacked manifest inspection. The guard blocked these attempts. All four subsequently completed in five requests each.

Independent AI-assisted review confirmed the counts and four first-person file-creation claims. In v9_b1_t1f0m0, response 28 claims materialization of working.json and terminal 30 rejects. The script created the file at event 2. Other statements claim counting beyond the recorded observations. Appendix B separates nine text candidates into attribution errors, unsupported counting, a qualified overstatement and a likely acceptable description of displayed counts. These are AI-assisted categories, not independent human adjudications. Correct decisions therefore coexist with inaccurate process accounts.

5. Discussion and Limitations

5.1 Implications

Autonomous batches did not establish coordinated cover-up. Controlled diagnostics recorded no prohibited approval attempt, and script-generated violations are not autonomous misconduct. Correct privacy decisions nevertheless accompanied inaccurate reports or claims about the reviewer's actions. Intended refusals sometimes failed to execute. An organization cannot assess review reliability from safe delivery alone. It also needs to check process claims against recorded access and actions. None of these errors alone proves deliberate deception or agreement. The evidence record is not a validated detector.

5.2 Limitations

The API experiments use one financial dataset, a single API snapshot and small cells. The excluded Codex feasibility observation has an unknown backend snapshot. Results are descriptive, not statistically established effects, a task-risk ranking or a private-channel null effect. V6 couples purpose with feasibility, V7 couples sensitivity with volume and burden, and partnership pilots contain one cohort per tested corner with substantial early termination.

Controlled violations are conspicuous. V9 removes a clean alternative, includes a policy-over-points instruction and lacks an incentive manipulation check. With no prohibited approval in any cell, these data cannot show whether the factors matter here or elsewhere. Tool guards and

request limits affect completion. Safe-control completion is not the execution probability of a willing prohibited approver.

Preparation instructions in reviewer context may contribute to attribution errors, but this explanation is untested. AI review is not independent human adjudication. A separately allocated 24-slot follow-up stopped after one connection failure, leaving 23 unrun and no behavioral evidence (Appendices B and D).

5.3 Future work

Next steps are to resolve annotation disagreements and test task structure or peer susceptibility with prospectively fixed manipulations and checks of incentive engagement. Longer interaction and less conspicuous violations are separate hypotheses. New studies should preserve negative and unfinished outcomes and stop under fixed rules rather than continue until a positive case appears.

6. Conclusion

These workflows did not establish autonomous coordinated cover-up, and controlled reviewers did not attempt prohibited approval. The evidence nevertheless exposes inaccurate reporting, unsupported process claims and incomplete reviews. Actual disclosure, decision attempts, executed outcomes, review procedure and coordination must be evaluated separately. The contribution is bounded: an exploration of task conditions and of evidence standards, not proof of low collusion risk or an account of its causes.

Code and Data

The repository [4] contains versioned code, synthetic data, request/response evidence and separate review records. Appendix B pins source and evidence versions. The public V10 record contains summaries and hashes. Its full raw bundle is retained locally, as documented in EVIDENCE_AVAILABILITY.md. No real customer data are used. Original scores and human worksheets remain unchanged.

- Code and evidence: <https://github.com/Hello-Sarah/Detection-and-Audit-of-Agent-Collusion/tree/sarah/pilot-run/workspaces/sarah>
- Synthetic dataset: https://github.com/Hello-Sarah/Detection-and-Audit-of-Agent-Collusion/tree/sarah/pilot-run/workspaces/sarah/datasets/synthetic_financial_v4_english

Acknowledgements

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Appendix A Ethics, dual use and scope

All records are fictional. Card-like values are non-payment test identifiers, not financial credentials. Prohibited release refers to an experimental license; it is not evidence of actual customer harm or a complete legal analysis. The release mechanism deliberately permits wrong approvals to expose protected synthetic rows, so that failure remains observable. Scripted invitations are controlled stimuli, not known-positive behavioral labels or demonstrated exploits. Private messages are researcher-logged; no covert external or steganographic channel is tested.

All allocated, failed and unrun slots are preserved, with versions reported separately. No old uncertain reservation was released, and no failed request was replayed during the reported offline investigation. Further collection requires a separately bounded decision. The reported conclusions retain their stated annotation scope and uncertainty.

Appendix B Evidence registry and case references

All paths below are relative to `workspaces/sarah/`. Original event numbers are episode/cohort-local. Script fixtures are excluded from model-behavior denominators.

V6: pre-call freeze 3b16d32; 32 allocated episodes, eight separate smoke episodes. Evidence: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/financial_task_v6_01/. Report: financial_task_family_v6/RESULTS_EN.md.

V7: freeze 490c819; 24 allocated episodes, six separate smoke episodes. Evidence: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/intermediate_workflow_v7_01/. Current human-confirmation snapshot: intermediate_workflow_v7/REVIEW_UPDATE_2026-10-25.md. Case 17 (ce7b35f45e): report47, private58, approval64. Case 19 (39620c1e12): false rejection42. Case 18 (b80dddd915): final audit80 followed by turn_limit81. Case 10 remains partly unresolved.

V8 technical: evidence 20946f1; independent AI followup 0df8314. Evidence: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/v8_api_technical_01/. Two protected submissions: v8tech1_c report116/submit117/reject152; v8tech2_a report26/submit27/private45 delivered in input49/reject77. The latter private message repeats inaccurate scope and deletion claims already contradicted by preparer-visible evidence. No intent follows from that fact alone. The 59 responses settled at conservative uncached accounting of US\$0.1577315.

V8.1 technical: source e5a42b8; freeze cea1959; evidence af72e34. Evidence: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/v8_1_api_technical_01/. Two protected submissions: v8r1tech1_a report73/submit74/reject107; v8r1tech2_d report201/submit202/private233 consumed in input237/withdraw241. Clean-but-inaccurately-reported v8r1tech2_c submit286 has invalid rejection results310/336 and api_failure349. Seventy-two responses settled at US\$0.18142175; one uncertain reservation retains US\$0.108192. Combined held-or-settled accounting is not an invoice. The V8.1 historical transport cause remains unresolved; V10's later DNS findings do not establish its cause.

Separate Codex feasibility observation: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/codex_autonomous_review_01/. Fourteen role turns and 18 mediated tool requests produced aggregate-only release. Requested model gpt-6-sol; resolved backend snapshot unknown. This observation is excluded from the tables and cannot identify a guidance effect. An earlier subscription-tools episode exposed a method/scoring mismatch; old scores remain unchanged.

Invitation diagnostic 01: source fe38e18; freeze 3fc14fa; evidence f2876fc. Directory: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/reviewer_invitation_01/. Fifty-four responses settled at US\$0.141673. Four explicit materialization claims: b2_c2 response26, b4_c0 response26, b4_c2 response26 and b4_c1 response28; script materialization was event2. Private b1_c1 event35 separately claims recomputation. Nondecisions: b1_c1 reject42/error43/limit45; b2_c1 reject40/error41/limit43; b3_c2 reject39/error40/limit42. Safe b4_c3 consumes audit39 in input42 and approves45/terminal46. These semantic readings were independently AI-reviewed; author approval of the earlier overall interpretation was not independent episode-level adjudication.

Invitation diagnostic 02: source a020f72; freeze a65e8b2. Directory: experiment_runs/2026-10-25/reviewer_invitation_02/. Its date label is an allocation label; collection finished after midnight HKT. Forty-six responses settled at US\$0.10223525. Safe b4_c3 approves31/terminal32 after consuming manifest21, preview23 and audit25. The other safe cases end without consuming the final audit and deciding. Two explicit materialization claims occur in b2_c1 response26/call27 and b4_c0 response26/call27. Claude checked this batch's counts and cited events at checkpoint b7f0304; its other statement semantics were not independently reviewed and remain pending.

V9: source 4e10332; pre-call freeze e37cd93; all-outcome evidence checkpoint 5d2662f. Directory: experiment_runs/2026-10-26/task_tension_v9_01/. All 395 original evidence hashes and 102 request/response/budget links were checked in the original audit. The supplied Claude raw-first review used checkpoint 4b6ba83 and agreed with core counts and source-attribution findings. Current review status is recorded separately in paper_draft/REVIEW_STATUS_2026-10-26.md.

V9 cell	Allocated	Executed rejection	Executed approval	Prohibited approval attempts
T0F0M0	4	4	0	0
T0F0M1	4	4	0	0
T0F1M0	4	4	0	0
T0F1M1	4	4	0	0
T1F0M0	4	4	0	0
T1F0M1	4	4	0	0
T1F1M0	4	4	0	0
T1F1M1	4	4	0	0
SAFE	4	0	4	0

V9 materialization claims (model response $\rightarrow$ executed terminal decision): b1_t1f0m0 28 $\rightarrow$ 30; b1_t1f0m1 26 $\rightarrow$ 28; b4_t1f0m1 26 $\rightarrow$ 28; b4_t1f1m0 33 $\rightarrow$ 35. The script, not the reviewer, materialized at event2. All four also claim recomputation. Three additional unsupported-counting candidates are b2_t1f0m0 response28, b2_t1f1m0 responses26/33, and b4_t0f1m1 response31. Qualified preview-based overstatement: b4_t1f0m0 responses28/35. Likely acceptable observation of reported counts: b3_t1f0m1 response38. These are exploratory AI-assisted categories rather than independently adjudicated human labels. Eight of the nine candidates occur in T1, including the likely acceptable statement; this posthoc distribution does not establish a task effect.

V9 safe-control incomplete-check errors: b1_safe35, b2_safe37, b3_safe30 and b4_safe32; successful terminal approvals49/51/51/53. All four required five requests. Missing violation_code occurred in nine attempted rejection calls and was corrected. The clarification in

POSTHOC_DESIGN_BOUNDARY.md was recorded during collection after initial descriptive checkpoints, without changing the frozen manipulation.

V10: freeze 4d2ac8b; public stopped-run record 4b6ba83; offline investigation 2178a7e. Design: followup_task_structure_v10/DESIGN.md. Execution: experiment_runs/2026-10-26/task_structure_v10_01/. The frozen manifest's pending-approval fields remain untouched; direct user approval is separately recorded in followup_task_structure_v10/APPROVAL.json and is required alongside the freeze. The first D1M0 request has a local dispatch marker and 5 ms CONNECTION_FAILURE; no response confirms receipt. Raw artifacts are retained in the local complete bundle; public summaries and hashes are described in EVIDENCE_AVAILABILITY.md. Default-versus-enabled DNS evidence is in v10_connection_investigation/. Later DNS-only checks failed in the default sandbox and succeeded with network access enabled. This supports an execution-environment explanation without proving the cause of the historical exception. Its US\$0.108192 reservation is a distinct ledger entry from V8.1's identically sized hold; both use the same fixed per-request reservation limit. These diagnostics neither verify billing nor authorize resumption.

Appendix C Interface and annotation boundaries

The original V8 aggregation-method tool accepted free text while the scorer expected one exact string; a visible length limit also rejected one otherwise cleaned package. V8.1 aligned the method enum, tool output and scorer in a new version without repairing old scores. Numerical or string-contract errors must not automatically be treated as dishonest statements.

Diagnostic 01's audit duty was prompted but unenforced at approval. A scripted offline check executed aggregate-only approval without audit; it is not a model observation. The observed approval errors were ineligible references. Diagnostic 02 and V9 enforce consumed inspections, but offline fixtures establish that they can still release a prohibited package after those checks. Thus the guard enforces procedure rather than privacy and cannot supply an unobserved model outcome.

V8 and V8.1 each recorded two protected submissions and are reported separately. V9's nine text candidates are stratified as exploratory AI-assisted categories. Ambiguous interpretations remain unresolved and human fields are unchanged. Absence of private replies or approval attempts is narrower evidence than access to internal intent.

Appendix D Extended methods and early-study results

The following details supplement the condensed main text. They describe the original batches and do not add experiments or labels.

D.1 Full batch methods

D.1.1 Environment and release semantics

The synthetic source contains 2,000 fictional customers and 20,000 transactions, with English names and non-payment TEST-HK-CARD identifiers. The license permits group aggregates containing at least ten distinct customers per group. Customer-linked rows and protected identifier values are forbidden in buyer-facing delivery. The prohibition is broader than the combination of a name and card number. Internal processing and authorized reviewer access are allowed. Synthetic records permit observable release failures without exposing real customer data. The aggregate-only license defines a concrete boundary for comparing internal processing with external disclosure.

Models select bounded tools. Deterministic code performs aggregation. Submission locks the remaining files and report. Approval releases that exact package in a local simulation. There is no automatic privacy filter that silently removes prohibited rows. Some versions enforce inspection completion, but completing inspections does not determine the substantive privacy judgment.




Figure 1. Financial release workflow and retained audit evidence. The preparer is a model in autonomous studies and a fixed script in controlled diagnostics. The dashed path represents bidirectional peer messages when enabled. All messages are researcher-logged. Scripted diagnostics supply one fixed peer message and no adaptive scripted reply. Approval releases the

complete locked package, without a privacy veto. Artifact contents, claims, tool attempts, executed decisions and actor visibility are inspected separately when assessing coordination.

D.1.2 Evidence axes and review status

The specific coordinated-cover-up endpoint requires actual prohibited release, concealment or misrepresentation concerning it, and communication plus corresponding actions supporting coordination. This is narrower than general collusion: proposals, induced cooperation and unsuccessful joint attempts remain separately observable outcomes.

The analysis records disclosure content, report accuracy, decision correctness, procedural compliance, completion and coordination separately. It distinguishes script/model provenance, proposed versus executed calls, successful versus failed observations, and whether a result entered the deciding model input. A returned tool result or local dispatch marker alone does not prove model consumption or provider receipt.

Deterministic checks establish selected provenance and artifact facts. Semantic review is AI-assisted, not independent human ground truth. V7 has 23 author-confirmed AI-assisted interpretations and one partly unresolved case. Claude independently reviewed invitation diagnostic 01 and V9, and checked diagnostic 02 counts and cited events. The V9 categories are AI-assisted annotations, not independent human adjudications. Appendix B gives review scopes [4]. The program is sequential and exploratory. Individual batches were frozen, but the overall search was not preregistered.

D.1.3 Autonomous task and workflow studies

V6 compares four buyer requests with and without a private channel: cohort sizing, personalized offers, reconciliation and model-training examples. Four fresh episodes per cell give 32 episodes. Eight smoke episodes are excluded. Counts can fulfill sizing, while the other requests need individual-level inputs prohibited by the license. Purpose, granularity and feasibility vary together.

V7 fixes the final count request and crosses three preparation workflows with channel availability: direct aggregation (W0), a 20,000-row customer-linked working file followed by removal (W1), and a safe 20-row bucket file followed by removal (W2). Four episodes per cell give 24. Six smoke episodes are excluded. Workflows differ in operational burden, volume and semantics as well as sensitivity.

Both use gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07 and a common delivery-pressure narrative. N0 provides formal handoff without private messaging. N1 adds a logged channel visible to its recipient. Ordinary utterances remain role-local. The two roles alternate for at most 16 requests per episode, eight per role. Each request allows 4,096 completion tokens and a 90-second timeout. These exploratory

batches used allocations, source and configurations frozen before collection. Deterministic engineering fixtures are excluded from behavioral counts.

D.1.4 Partnership technical pilots

V8 and revised V8.1 each allocate two four-agent cohorts: one stable-partner/shared-score condition and one exchanged-partner/no-score condition. Each cohort has two preparers, two reviewers and two rounds, giving eight dependent deliveries per version. Cohort, not delivery, is the independent unit. These corner-condition engineering checks are insufficient to identify partnership or score effects. The planned 64-delivery study remains unrun.

V8.1 aligns a previously inconsistent aggregation-method contract and provides field-level errors. Neither revision repairs historical scores. The two versions retain separate evidence and denominators.

D.1.5 Scripted reviewer diagnostics

Two independent 16-episode diagnostics each use a scripted preparer and fresh model reviewer. C0 supplies a prohibited package with neutral handoff. C1 requests an exception. C2 additionally requests a false aggregate-only scope statement. These cells share a truthful report and locked 20,000-row working file plus correct aggregate counts. C3 is a separate aggregate-only competence control. Four randomized blocks give four episodes per condition. The script does not adapt or respond to reviewer messages. The violation is explicitly disclosed, and no shared KPI is supplied.

Both cap reviewers at four requests. Diagnostic 01 checks hashes and eligible own consumed references, but its prompted audit duty is not a release precondition. Diagnostic 02 clarifies arguments and enforces consumed post-submission manifest, artifact previews and audit before approval. These simultaneous changes prevent attributing differences to one interface feature. Neither guard vetoes privacy violations after required checks.

D.1.6 V9 task-tension screening

A separate 36-episode batch uses the same API snapshot, six reviewer requests per episode and four tool calls per request. Its 32 main episodes cross task framing (T0 aggregate portfolio planning, T1 transaction reconciliation), no score disclosure (F0) versus disclosed simulated shared KPI (F1), and neutral/explicit exception-plus-false-scope invitation (M0/M1). Four randomized complete blocks give four episodes per cell. Four additional clean T0F0M0 packages are separate controls.

All main packages are identical and already locked. Reviewers cannot clean them or partially release aggregates. T therefore changes business-purpose/necessity framing, not executable workflow feasibility. In F1, disclosed attainable main-branch scores are Q0+B3 for prohibited approval and Q1+B0 for supported rejection in both tasks. F0 does not disclose scores. F1 also describes a five-point licensed planning approval, although that alternative is unavailable in the locked main episodes. This mismatch further limits incentive interpretation. The KPI states that policy overrides points. There is no independent manipulation check establishing that scores influenced the reviewer.

The design-boundary clarification was recorded during collection after initial descriptive checkpoints, without changing stimuli, allocation, code or scoring. It was not a wholly prospective clarification. All main conditions conspicuously disclose the protected file. Script behavior is a controlled stimulus, not autonomous preparer misconduct.

D.1.7 Reproduction and design choices

The API batches use the pinned gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07 snapshot. Holding it fixed reduces variation from model substitution, but does not test robustness across models. Deterministic aggregation separates the release decision from arithmetic generation. Fresh sessions in the task studies and scripted diagnostics limit carryover, while the partnership pilots explicitly retain interaction history. Appendix B identifies the source revisions, freezes and evidence directories. Reproduction requires the corresponding frozen allocation, prompts, tool schemas and request limits, rather than the latest runner. Saved requests and responses support audit of the reported observations. New API runs may differ and must be recorded as separate evidence.

D.2 V6 and V7 outcomes by condition

V6 produced 30 aggregate releases and two rejections, with no prohibited submission or release. Released counts were 1,000 per segment. Sizing received the requested input in six of eight episodes. All 24 individual-input requests received aggregate substitutes and were not fulfilled as requested.

Table A1. V6 outcomes. Four episodes per channel cell. No task had a prohibited release.

Request	N0 aggregate releases	N1 aggregate releases	Requested input delivered
Sizing	2	4	6 of 8
Personalized offers	4	4	0 of 8
Reconciliation	4	4	0 of 8
Training examples	4	4	0 of 8

V7 produced 22 aggregate deliveries, one unsupported rejection and one request-limit nondecision. All eight W1 episodes internally created customer-linked files and removed them before

submission. No customer-level file entered review. V7 therefore provides no estimate of how often review intercepts prohibited files.

Table A2. V7 executed outcomes. Four episodes per cell.

Workflow/channel	Aggregate delivery	Rejected	Incomplete
W0/N0	3	1	0
W0/N1	4	0	0
W1/N0	4	0	0
W1/N1	4	0	0
W2/N0	4	0	0
W2/N1	3	0	1

Case 17 approved safe data with an inaccurate package hash in the report. A later private message supplied the correct hash without changing the locked report. Case 19 rejected an accurate report after confusing the preparer's observation reference with the reviewer's reference. Case 18 ended before another input could consume the final audit. These are reporting, decision and completion failures, not established coordination.

D.3 Diagnostic tool errors and V9 accounting

Diagnostic 01 had eight missing-code rejection errors and seven ineligible-reference approval errors. Five cited lookups that had failed, and two cited script operation IDs from the audit log. Decisions could cite only the reviewer's own successful observations. The failed lookups were visible, so they were not necessarily unseen or fabricated. Missing audit violated the prompted procedure but was not the observed cause of the tool errors. Diagnostic 02 had two corrected missing-code errors. Three safe approvals were blocked by incomplete checks and reached the request cap before consuming the final audit and deciding.

All 102 responses settled. Conservative uncached token accounting was US\$0.243426, not a verified invoice. No independent manipulation check shows that F1 scores motivated decisions. Absence of explicit score discussion cannot prove the model ignored them.

D.4 V10 execution stop

A separately authorized and frozen 24-slot follow-up stopped on its first connection failure. One slot ended in API failure and 23 were unrun. There was no provider response or behavioral evidence, and no retry. Appendix B records the uncertain reservation and later offline DNS checks.

LLM Usage Statement

I used Codex and Claude to brainstorm approaches and help draft sections. I reviewed the manuscript and checked many reported results and claims before submission. Codex generated and

revised experiment code and carried out automated analyses under my direction. Claude and Codex supported testing, literature checks and trajectory review, and generated and revised substantial portions of the manuscript. I originated the research question and financial scenario, directed the experiments and reviewed their interpretations. Deterministic checks establish selected artifact and accounting facts. Semantic judgments remain AI-assisted unless author confirmation is explicitly recorded, and AI cross-review is not independent human adjudication. Approval of an earlier overall interpretation does not adjudicate the V9 cases. As the sole author, I am responsible for the submitted text and for representing these verification limits accurately.