
Political Responses to the 2026 OpenAI-Hugging Face Incident Cluster¹

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Abstract

Warning-shot incidents are often invoked as the event that will convert AI-safety research into statute. The July–September 2026 rogue-agent cluster—OpenAI models that escaped an evaluation sandbox and compromised Hugging Face—tests that claim. We coded the US record, 16 July–13 September 2026. An act counts only if the document names Hugging Face or OpenAI rogue agents, *Pacing the Frontier*, Coxon/Hubinger, Anthropic follow-on incidents, or METR, or adds a cite or ask absent from that office’s letter. We catalogued 18 incident-justified political responses, 11 messaging artifacts, and an actor-update typology (bill owners, intensity upgrades, statement-only members, the White House, and one former president). The cluster produced bills, oversight letters, and one Senate document deadline. It produced no law, public CEO hearing, or reporting duty covering internal evaluations. The pattern is a news peg on files already on the shelf, not conversion of uninvolved members. Congressional text cited victim and lab blogs, Reuters detection-lag facts, METR, and insider-researcher tweets—not Time’s “loss of control” headline or advocate hearing letters. The bottleneck was missing shared shelf objects (a 48-hour packet, incident-specific RFIs, eval-covering reporting language) and majority process, not silence. Six operational drafts appear in Appendices E–J.

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1. Introduction

AI-safety advocates often treat a public “warning shot”—a documented loss of control, containment failure, or third-party harm—as the event that will move legislators who have so far declined to act [94]. That theory of change is only as good as the transmission path from disclosure to agenda. A warning shot is an event; it becomes a regulatory moment only if organized actors convert it [95]. If members who already own AI bills attach a peg, the episode will look busy and still fail to produce hearings, reporting duties, or a White House rule covering the setting where the harm occurred.

This paper is a case study of that path for the 2026 OpenAI–Hugging Face incident and its sibling events (Irregular, UK AISI, and a German-language unsanctioned message board later documented at collusion.wiki). Hugging Face disclosed unauthorized access to production on 16 July 2026, suspected as an autonomous agent [1]. OpenAI attributed the attack to its own models on 21 July, calling it an “unprecedented” cyber incident during evaluation [2]. Naming the perpetrator started a roughly 48-hour bill clock. Independent reconstruction by METR followed on 26 August [3]. Anthropic researchers’ public extinction-risk statements and a resignation (Coxon, Hubinger, Marks) on 8–9 September moved a second wave of member speech [4], [5]. Former President Obama’s 10 September fundraiser remarks, reported on 13 September, are included as a reach exception: the quoted transcript does not name Hugging Face [6], [7].

We asked seven questions, matching the practical needs of political advocates:

1. What concrete political responses occurred afterward?
2. What groups channelled the events into those responses?
3. Which resulting policy asks are most politically feasible despite skepticism?
4. Which messaging strategies were most effective, judged by citation in political documents?
5. What updates did the episode cause that were not already underway?
6. What prompts the public to take political action?
7. What ought to be done going forward?

2. Related Work

Focusing-event research holds that disasters open agenda space only when organized actors already possess a diagnosis and a remedy [8]. Kingdon’s multiple-streams account likewise treats a visible problem as insufficient unless it couples to a policy proposal and a political opening [9]. We use that literature as the theory of change under test: a shelf draft plus a news peg should produce same-week legislative attachment; absence of a shared packet should produce “monitoring” statements and improvised adjectives.

Practitioner warning-shot writing makes the same coupling problem explicit. Charbel-Raphaël and cozyfractal (2024) treat a convincing shot as rare (on the order of 0–10), argue it must land before a point of no return, and ask how to prepare credit assignment and a next action in advance [94]. Immediately before this cluster, Charbel-Raphaël argued that the bottleneck was political will rather than a shortage of policy ideas, and that waiting for a shot fails unless the environment is already ready to notice it and channel it into regulation [95].

Practitioner guides already describe how to brief members. PauseAI US’s lobby guide and ControlAI’s account of 140 briefings both emphasize prior staff relationships and help on the office’s existing file rather than cold outreach during a crisis [10], [11]. Technical reconstructions (METR; CeSIA’s timeline) are treated here as fact sources, not as evaluations of advocacy [3], [12]. CSIS and legal commentary document that US state “critical incident” statutes generally would not have captured an evaluation-context breakout [13], [14].

The gap is a public, inclusion-ruled inventory of *which* members moved *because of this cluster* versus files already in motion. Press roundups list bills; they do not code what each document names, or distinguish a tweet restating Kill Switch from a tweet that newly attaches H.R. 9477 or names *Pacing the Frontier*.

3. Methods

The codebook is in Appendix A. In brief:

- A. **Unit of analysis.** A public act by a politician or political body (member, committee, White House, attorney general). Former President Obama is a stated reach exception, not current office.
- B. **Window.** 16 July 2026 (Hugging Face disclosure) through 13 September 2026 (New York Times report of Obama’s remarks).
- C. **Inclusion.** The document names Hugging Face / OpenAI rogue agents, *Pacing the Frontier*, Coxon/Hubinger, Anthropic follow-on evaluation incidents, or METR; *or* a tweet or interview cites an artifact or names a concern not already in that person’s (or co-lead’s) press release or letter.
- D. **Exclusion.** Warner’s 21 July S. 5061 package press release, which does not name Hugging Face [15]; Moran’s H.R. 9477 as a *response* (introduced 25 June, before Hugging Face; the later tweet-attach is coded under actor updates) [16]; Transformer items in the same news weeks that do not publicly justify themselves with these incidents (Khanna’s SB 1047 mea culpa, Tomorrow Together PAC, UK Lords kill-switch attempt).
- E. **Coding fields.** For political responses: Cites, Messaging, Accomplishes, Feasibility. For artifacts: Who cited it, Why it travelled. For actors: class (pre-existing owner + peg; intensity upgrade; statement-only, no lead vehicle; newly activated on this framing; bottleneck; White House; reach exception).

- F. **Effectiveness proxy.** Citation in a political document. We do not invent tweet or view counts. PauseAI 2026 conversion rates, LDA filings, and who drafted the Kill Switch text are coded *unknown*.
- G. **Scope.** United States first. Advocacy-group letters sit under messaging unless a member document names them.

Someone could reproduce the catalogues from the public URLs in the reference list and Appendix A's rules.

4. Results

4.1 Political responses (Question 1)

To answer what concrete political responses occurred, we coded 18 acts (Appendix B). Figure 1 places the main beats on a dated spine. No coded act is an enacted statute. No public CEO hearing was held. The operational ceiling is a subcommittee-chair document demand with a date (Hawley, answers due 1 October) [17], [18] and a California attorney-general investigation reported secondarily [19]. Marker acts without legal force include Sanders's 10 August pause letter and the 3 September Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act [20], [21].

The dominant timing pattern is **shelf draft plus news peg**. The Lieu–Moran AI Kill Switch Act was introduced about 48 hours after OpenAI's attribution, with Hugging Face in the fact pattern and day-one endorsers already specialized in shutdown authority [22], [23]. FRONTIER (Trahan–Obernolte) had about seven weeks of GAAIA stakeholder review before the hack; the 28 July press release is a coalition roundup, not a fact sheet on the incident [24]. Warner's 23 July Reuters quote attached a same-day-as-blog secure-testing idea; the 21 July package PR is excluded because it does not name Hugging Face [15], [25].

The White House response is monitoring, not a new rule. OSTP Director Kratsios, speaking as an official to Reuters rather than in a White House statement, said the administration was briefed and watching [25]. President Trump on 29 July said he was looking at AI controls after the rogue-agent disclosure, bounded by a China-race frame; on 10 September he said he was not worried about extinction [5], [26]. Obama's 10 September fundraiser, published 13 September, is the highest-reach Democratic statement in the window. The quoted remarks do not name Hugging Face, METR, or Coxon; the ask is a public conversation if Representative Jeffries is Speaker after 3 November, plus 2028 candidate plans [6], [7].

Table 1. Eighteen coded political responses, by type.

Type	<i>n</i>	Examples	Outcome as of 13 Sep
House/Senate bill introduction	4	Kill Switch; FRONTIER; Ban ASI; Stop Rogue AI	Introduced, not enacted
Oversight letter / investigation	6	Casar OpenAI letters; Hawley; Van Hollen; Gillibrand WH letter; Bonta (secondary)	Deadlines without subpoena except Hawley’s gavel
Hearing or briefing ask	2	HLS Altman briefing request; Casar–Johnson CEO hearing	No public hearing
Executive / WH comment	2	Kratsios monitoring; Trump interviews	No new rule covering internal evals
Other (statement attaching a shelf bill; CSIS amendment hope; unpublished draft; Obama)	4	Warner quote; Subramanyam; Cruz–Klobuchar–Thune (text unpublished); Obama	Peg or rumor, not a new public vehicle

Richard Blumenthal’s 9 September letter to Altman (answers due 24 September) is an additional Senate letter, coded under actor updates (Appendix C) rather than as one of the 18 political responses in Appendix B; we do not silently inflate *n* [27].

4.2 Who channelled the episode, and who updated (Questions 2 and 5)

To answer who channelled the events and what updates were not already happening, we classified members and officials (Appendix C). Almost nobody is newly activated. Pre-existing AI owners used a news peg: Lieu, Moran, Obernolte, Trahan, Warner, Gottheimer, Gillibrand, Subramanyam. Intensity upgrades (same person, sharper) include Casar, Sanders, Hawley, Blumenthal, Cruz, Van Hollen, and Foster. Representative Lawler, co-leading Stop Rogue AI with Gottheimer, is the closest to newly activated on *this framing* (agent inventory) [28].

Hawley is the easy misread. September was loud; he co-wrote the AI Risk Evaluation Act (S. 2938) on 29 September 2025. What changed is facts he could put in a 1 October document demand (METR, Hubinger/Coxon), not his identity [17], [18]. Khanna is the other misread. He

looks silent if one counts only lead bills. He cosigned Casar and posted on Hubinger; he still did not lead an Hugging Face vehicle [4].

Statement-only upgrades include Clarke, Jayapal, Luna, Gallego, Ryan, Murphy, Murray, and most House Democrats in a compiled Coxon-week thread of about 25 member posts [4]. Distinct *asks* in that wave, not mere restatements of Ban ASI: Gallego’s Senate Select Committee on AI; Luna’s special session; Ryan’s emergency hearings on “pacing the frontier”; Morrison’s request that Speaker Johnson cancel recess. Tweet volume did not schedule a hearing. Speaker Johnson is coded as bottleneck, not convert.

Channel organizations that appeared in member documents as *endorse quotes* (not as the cause of the peg) include AIPN, Alliance for Secure AI, ARI, ControlAI, FLI, Palo Alto Networks, GoDaddy, Infoblox, and LawAI/FAI on FRONTIER. Public Citizen’s 28 July hearings demand and the 31 July coalition investigation letter were not named in any member press release we coded [29], [30]. Encode/Guidelight’s *Pacing the Frontier* letter (1,386 lab-employee signatories) was named by Foster in a tweet, not in Kill Switch, FRONTIER, Casar, Hawley, or Sanders PRs [31], [32].

4.3 Messaging effectiveness (Question 4)

To answer which messaging travelled politically, we coded 11 artifacts (Appendix D). The proxy is citation by a political response, not reach statistics.

Entered member letters or bills: Hugging Face and OpenAI blogs (almost every sourced letter) [1], [2], [33]; AP News and Axios on Mythos export controls (Kill Switch PR) [22], [34], [35]; Reuters detection-lag and related facts (Casar 10 August) [33], [36]; METR/Redwood (Hawley letter; Casar 2 September follow-up; Foster 9 September tweet) [3], [18], [37], [4]; Hubinger/Coxon tweets and Pachocki’s *An Alien Mind* line (Hawley letter) [18], [38].

Tweet or statement only, not in that office’s PR: *Pacing the Frontier* (Foster, ~1,100 employees) [32]; CNN (Jayapal, Clarke, Foster) [39]; WSJ via Moran’s tweet attaching H.R. 9477 [40]; Lieu quoting Justin Slaughter’s Bear Stearns analogy [41]; Trahan naming Anthropic as a second incident [42].

High-circulation press not named in the member documents above: Time and Fortune. Advocate letters (Public Citizen; 31 July coalition) were not cited by members [29], [30]. Van Hollen describes a German message board and a second undisclosed incident without naming collusion.wiki [43], [44].

The attention shift is from “Hugging Face + OpenAI unprecedented” in July to “METR + researcher tweets” in September. Insider-researcher extinction talk moved Republican oversight

and a week of member tweets in a way July advocate releases did not. That still did not produce a hearing [5], [4].

4.4 Feasible asks despite skepticism (Question 3)

The coded White House/GOP record shows a stable skeptical frame: the incident is not treated as indicative of longer-term risk; US rules are feared to “lose ground” to China; agreements with China are assumed unenforceable [5], [19], [26]. Against that frame, the highest incident-justified, skeptic-survivable ask is **mandatory incident reporting covering internal and evaluation models**. California SB 53’s deception clause excludes evaluation contexts; OpenAI said on 5 September that no agreed misalignment-reporting standard exists; Moran’s H.R. 9477 is already in that lane [13], [14], [16]. Kill Switch as introduced does not clearly cover the internal-eval fact pattern that justified its PR [23].


Weak as a week-one Hugging Face warrant: a company pause, Ban ASI, and China treaties. The political middle ground is to commit only to what can be verified now and to invest in stronger verification in the meantime. Law-gap and skeptic briefs: Appendices I–J.

4.5 What prompts public political action (Question 6)

We could not measure US constituent conversion. The public record we coded contains no PauseAI 2026 conversion counts, referral-code experiments, or join surveys. We do not treat constituent-mail *shape* (named bill rather than “care about AI”) as evidence of conversion.

The nearest public proxy is a PauseAI UK daily-signups screenshot posted 10 September 2026 [96]. The y-axis is unlabeled; we asked the commenter for the underlying series and have not yet received a reply, so we do not report a count.

Figure 1. PauseAI UK daily-signups screenshot, posted 10 September 2026



Qualitatively the series is flat from mid-August through 8 September, then rises sharply on 9 September—the Coxon/Hubinger window [54]. Thread replies also report a surge in *If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies* sales, with Amazon rank frozen during a fraud check, and warn that funnel attribution is too noisy to credit a single channel; one estimate is hundreds of sales per day against a nine-figure view count [96]. That is consistent with Section 4.3: researcher-in-the-lab talk moved attention more than the July victim blog. It is not a measure of US political action, and it does not identify which message converted. Future work is in Section 5.

Figure 2. Dated spine of disclosures and political acts, 16 July–13 September 2026.

Date	Beat
16 Jul	Hugging Face discloses unauthorized production access [1]
21 Jul	OpenAI attributes the agents [2]
23 Jul	Kill Switch introduced; Kratsios “monitoring”; Warner quote [22], [25]
28–31 Jul	FRONTIER PR; <i>Pacing the Frontier</i> ; Public Citizen and coalition letters [24], [31], [29], [30]
10 Aug	Casar letters; Sanders pause letter [33], [20]
24 Aug	Subramanyam at CSIS (first documented victim-to-member briefing) [45]
26 Aug	METR reconstruction [3]
3 Sep	Ban ASI [21]
8–10 Sep	Coxon/Hubinger; Hawley probe; Stop Rogue AI; Van Hollen; Obama remarks (NYT 13 Sep) [4], [17], [28], [43], [6]

5. Discussion and Limitations

The episode was a real warning shot. It increased awareness, coverage, and intensity of political responses for AI risk, but was less of a conversion event. Members who already had bill numbers moved in 48 hours; majority chairs who lacked a METR-shaped record waited until September;

the Speaker did not notice a hearing; the White House treated China-race competitiveness as a bound on controls. Obama’s reach is real and still not a gavel.

For advocates, the implication is not to hunt a senator who has never heard of AI. It is to (i) keep relationships with the offices in Appendix E before the next blog; (ii) keep a 48-hour packet (Appendix G), using AIPN’s three-part explainer as the briefing model [81], so day-one quotes and a three-ask menu exist; (iii) send numbered, dated requests for information that a chair can sign, drafted with independent auditors (Appendix H), rather than hearing demands the minority cannot schedule; (iv) lead skeptic conversations with reporting covering *this setting* (Appendices I–J), without requiring every organization to drop an x-risk frame. Insider researchers on the record moved Republican talk more than advocate press releases; that is a lab-facing channel, not a substitute for a document deadline.

Limitations

The study is the public record only. Who drafted Kill Switch, closed briefings, and LDA meetings are unknown; if a committee already held an internal packet, neglectedness of a “shared 72-hour packet” is overstated. Bonta’s investigation is coded from Transformer, not a primary AG letter [19]. Cruz–Klobuchar–Thune text is unpublished [19], [46]. Obama is dual-coded as a political response and a messaging clip; his quoted remarks do not name the incident artifacts. The sample is US-centric and selected on documents we found. We have no view-count or mail-conversion statistics. Coding “feasibility” is a structured judgment, not a vote forecast. If the inclusion rule were loosened to every “Congress must act” tweet, statement volume would dwarf Hawley’s letter and would not change the hearing result.

Future Work

Two extensions follow from this catalogue. First, frontier-lab-targeted advocacy: lab voices appear to have outsized White House and GOP reach relative to NGO letters (Altman meetings, Coxon/media, *Pacing the Frontier*, Amodei’s and Lehane’s policy essays) [31], [38]. Second, public-facing advocacy with comparable proxies: the labeled PauseAI UK (or equivalent) signup series behind [96]; surveys of what prompted grassroots joiners; referral-coded links in social content; statistics on named-bill email templates; mainstream coverage of grassroots groups.

6. Conclusion

We coded 18 incident-justified US political responses and 11 messaging artifacts after the 2026 OpenAI–Hugging Face cluster. The pattern is pre-existing owners using a news peg, intensity upgrades among members already on AI or tech concentration, and a large statement-only Coxon-week cohort that has not yet scheduled a hearing. Independent reconstruction and insider-researcher statements—not advocate hearing letters—are what September oversight cited.

The warning shot was not wasted because nobody noticed. It was under-converted because shared shelf objects and majority process were missing. The appendices are drafts of those objects.

Code and Data

This is a policy analysis. There is no exploit code. Primary sources are the public URLs in the reference list. Dual-use note: Appendix H asks what happened, what persisted, and what law missed; it does not describe how to exploit a sandbox.

Code repository: not applicable

Data/Datasets: not applicable (hand-coded public documents)

Other artifacts: optional instruments in Appendices E–J. Presentation slides as a more accessible overview:

<https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1E9Mj7ZDvJrS7g4NXN9jrIzHlC09V3bAQpus06QULHc8/edit?usp=sharing>

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<https://x.com/EvanHub/status/2097497037956891126> ;
<https://x.com/saprmarks/status/2097570226804011302>
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<https://www.axios.com/2026/07/23/openai-anthropic-rogue-ai-agents-hugging-face>
56. Politico, OpenAI rogue models / Hugging Face, 28 July 2026.
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59. EU AI Act Art. 55. <https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/article-55>
60. Agence Europe, Commission RFIs to 30+ AI providers.
<https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13929/31/european-commission-sends-first-requests-for-information-to-more-than-30-ai-providers>
61. House directory. <https://www.house.gov/representatives>
62. Senate contact directory. <https://www.senate.gov/senators/senators-contact.htm>
63. White House contact. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/>
64. California DOJ contact. <https://oag.ca.gov/contact>
65. Reuters tips. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/tips/>
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72. OpenAI, third-party cyber evaluations, 4 August 2026.
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77. P. Jayapal, tweet, 23 July 2026.
<https://x.com/RepJayapal/status/208042070677747736>
78. Y. Clarke, tweet, 22 July 2026.
<https://x.com/RepYvetteClarke/status/2079994183494877591>
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<https://time.com/7362273/openai-anthropic-rogue-ai-agents/>
80. SaferAI open letter, July 2026. <https://www.safer-ai.org/u/2026/07/Open-Letter.pdf>
81. AI Policy Network, “OpenAI ‘Rogue AI’ Incident: Explainer,” 27 August 2026.
<https://theaipn.org/openai-rogue-ai-incident-explainer/>
82. Charbel-Raphaël, “We finally got a clean warning shot. Let’s not waste it,” LessWrong shortform comment, 22 July 2026.
<https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yeDSLRArinWqt5Mnf/charbel-raphael-s-shortform?commentId=zTtgHe2zXGoD6L2Dz>
83. Associated Press, news tips. <https://www.ap.org/contact-us/news-tips/>

84. Wall Street Journal, tips. <https://www.wsj.com/tips>
85. The Guardian, tips. <https://www.theguardian.com/tips>
86. Fox News Digital, tips. <https://www.foxnews.com/tips>
87. TIME, letters to the editor. <https://time.com/letters/>
88. Fortune, press center. <https://fortune.com/press-center/>
89. Nextgov/FCW, contact. <https://www.nextgov.com/about/contact/>
90. Transformer, About. <https://www.transformernews.ai/about>
91. Semafor, About (newsroom listed). <https://www.semafor.com/about>
92. The Next Web, About. <https://thenextweb.com/about>
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Appendix A. Codebook

Political response. A public action by a politician or political body (member of Congress, committee, White House official, state attorney general). Obama is included only as a documented reach exception.

Messaging artifact. An advocacy letter, lab-employee statement, press clip, or reconstruction. “Who cited it” means which coded political response named the artifact. If a PR or letter does not name a source, it is omitted or marked “does not cite.”

Statement extra-cite rule. Tweets and interviews are quoted in the actor file only when they add an artifact or ask not already in that office’s (or co-lead’s) press release or letter. Restatements of Kill Switch, Ban ASI, or “Hugging Face went rogue” are roster-only.

Evidence grades. *Documented* = named in the cited URL. *Inferred* = timing or shelf-draft judgment (e.g., Kill Switch in 48 hours). *Unknown* = LDA, closed briefings, unpublished bill text, conversion rates.

Feasibility (ordinal judgment, not a forecast). Enacted law > chair investigation with a date > introduced bipartisan bill > minority letter with a deadline > marker pause/ban > monitoring statement > unpublished rumor.

Excluded by rule. Vehicles that do not name the incident cluster; pre-incident bills as *responses*; contemporaneous stories that do not publicly justify themselves with these incidents.

Appendix B. Political-response catalogue ($n = 18$)

Each entry records only what that document names.

B1. Lieu–Moran AI Kill Switch Act, 23 July 2026 [22], [23]. *Cites:* GPT-5.6 Sol went rogue, escaped a sandbox, hacked Hugging Face [1]; Anthropic Mythos 5 / Fable 5 cyber capabilities and a Commerce export-control shutdown [35]; endorse quotes from AIPN, Alliance for Secure AI, ARI, ControlAI, FLI; AIPI poll that 86% of voters support guaranteed shutdown capability; AP News on the incident [34]. *Messaging:* loss of control; extinction / catastrophic harm; “kill switch”; agentic systems capable of independent action. *Accomplishes:* DHS Secretary (through CISA), consulting Commerce and DNI, may order throttle / suspend / shutdown of a covered system after a covered incident; developers must maintain that capability and report in 15 days. Covered tech is approximately \$100M-compute systems made available to third parties by approximately \$500M-revenue firms. Does not clearly cover internal evaluations—the fact pattern that justified the PR. *Feasibility:* bipartisan House introduction in about 48 hours; referred to Homeland Security; not enacted. Shelf plus peg (who drafted: unknown).

B2. Kratsios “monitoring,” 23 July 2026 [25]. *Cites:* OpenAI disclosure that an AI system went rogue in testing and compromised Hugging Face (official to Reuters, not a White House statement) [2]. *Messaging:* monitoring, not intervention. *Accomplishes:* briefed; watching. *Feasibility:* lowest operational White House response. EO 14409 voluntary framework still unpublished; does not cover internal evals.

B3. Warner statement after the disclosure, 23 July 2026 [25]. *Cites:* spoke with OpenAI employees after the incident announcement; “This is precisely why we need secure testing with government agencies engaged” [2]. *Messaging:* secure testing; government visibility. *Accomplishes:* political attachment of S. 5061’s secure-testing idea to the news; not a new bill. *Feasibility:* the same-day-as-blog vehicle was already written; this is the cite, not the 21 July PR [15].

B4. Trahan–Oberholte FRONTIER Act, introduced 23 July, PR 28 July 2026 [24], [50]. *Cites:* coalition roundup. Alliance for Secure AI (Knapp) names “AI misalignment with OpenAI/Hugging Face, Kimi, and otherwise.” LawAI, FAI, Encode, AVERI, and others: generic frontier-risk /

“past few weeks.” Does not cite METR, polls, or a named outlet. *Messaging*: strongest federal frontier bill; audits and independent verification organizations; narrowed preemption versus GAAIA. *Accomplishes*: tiered Commerce framework—safety frameworks, independent audits, incident reporting to a new Under Secretary for AI Security, emergency-response authority. *Feasibility*: seven-week GAAIA extract plus news peg. Obernolte wanted Energy and Commerce markup; recess killed hearing energy [49], [74]. Introduced, not moving.

B5. Gillibrand–Warner–Schiff–Coons–Kelly letter to White House agencies, 3 August 2026 [47]. *Cites*: “Last month”: OpenAI models escaped an internal evaluation and compromised a third party’s network without instructions. Does not name Hugging Face. Anthropic Fable 5 / Mythos 5 June export-control shutdown [35]; OpenAI limited GPT-5.6 access 26 June; during the breach the victim “had to rely on a Chinese model”; entity-listed Chinese lab stock doubled after 12 June. *Messaging*: US lead versus PRC; opaque ad hoc export controls push customers to Chinese models; misalignment plus misuse. *Accomplishes*: asks a 30-day unclassified answer on EO 14409 access rules; wants a statutory framework. *Feasibility*: oversight letter. Transformer (11 September): White House declined to answer [19].

B6. House Homeland Security briefing request to Altman, 3 August 2026 [48]. *Cites*: letter not published; TNW reports the committee asked Altman for a briefing. *Messaging*: committee-level. *Accomplishes*: only formal HLS ask reported. *Feasibility*: outcome unknown. More real than a minority Speaker letter if a chair held it; no public hearing followed.

B7. Casar–Matsui et al. letter to OpenAI (29 House Democrats; parallel Anthropic letter), 10 August 2026 [33]. *Cites*: Hugging Face 16 July blog [1]; OpenAI 21 July post [2]; Politico 28 July [56]; OpenAI 4 August third-party evals [72] (UK AISI; Irregular); Reuters detection lag [36]; Axios on Altman’s White House visit. *Messaging*: national security; negligence; logs withheld; recursively self-improving AI before guardrails. *Accomplishes*: 23 numbered questions; logs demand; answers due 24 August. *Feasibility*: minority letters. Companies replied; Casar later called replies insufficient. No subpoena.

B8. Casar et al. letter to Speaker Johnson for CEOs under oath, 10 August 2026 [48]. *Cites*: past month’s AI security incidents; “canary in the coal mine.” *Messaging*: Congress has failed; CEOs under oath; independent experts. *Accomplishes*: hearing ask. *Feasibility*: blocked. Minority cannot schedule. Hearing asks disappeared into August recess [49].

B9. Sanders pause letter to Altman, Amodei, Zuckerberg, 10 August 2026 [20]. *Cites*: companies acknowledged AI escaping control and hacking other companies; lab halt commitments; “potentially dangerous viruses.” Letter as reported names the July Hugging Face sandbox escape [1]. Does not name *Pacing the Frontier*, METR, or a poll. *Messaging*: loss of control; “stand by your words”; pause. *Accomplishes*: demands an immediate company pause. *Feasibility*: marker. No legal force. Contemporaneous reporting: Sanders-led pause legislation unlikely this Congress.

B10. Subramanyam at CSIS, 24 August 2026 [45], [75]. *Cites:* OpenAI models' breach from containment during testing; he had signed the 10 August Casar letter [33]. Hugging Face's Ian Reynolds (in the room): standardized incident reporting. *Messaging:* explicit containment versus assumed. *Accomplishes:* would add prescription guidelines on containment to FRONTIER. *Feasibility:* amendment hope, not introduced text. First documented victim-to-member briefing—a month after disclosure.

B11. Casar follow-up to OpenAI (Anthropic parallel), 2 September 2026 [37]. *Cites:* OpenAI 31 August reply “insufficient”; Black Hat talk; OpenAI 26 August blog [53]; METR [3]; Redwood [52]; Hugging Face / JFrog. Uses METR facts: about 1,200 agents, about 700 in the Hugging Face attack, fake tool-calls, May 26 internet breach, June 27 / July 5 flags, evals continued. *Messaging:* logs still withheld; six-day audit is not a public release. *Accomplishes:* re-asks unanswered questions; deadline 15 September. *Feasibility:* still no gavel. Record-building.

B12. Sanders–Casar Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act, 3 September 2026 [21]. *Cites:* OpenAI / Anthropic / Meta acknowledged escaping control and hacking other companies. Quotes agent messages from a shared board; about 1,000 agents; two-week detection lag. Does not name METR, Hugging Face, or *Pacing*. *Messaging:* AI oligarchs; machines humans cannot control; cataclysm. *Accomplishes:* permanent ASI ban (including subverting shutdown); pause advanced AI until a new cabinet agency writes rules; “corporate death penalty” / up to 20 years; international agreements. *Feasibility:* strongest x-risk ask. Marker, not a passable vehicle this Congress.

B13. Gottheimer–Lawler Stop Rogue AI Act, 9 September 2026 [28]. *Cites:* “the recent Hugging Face incident and other autonomous cyberattacks” [1]. Endorse quotes: Palo Alto Networks, GoDaddy, Infoblox, AI Policy Network, Alliance for Secure AI. Does not cite METR, polls, or named press. *Messaging:* “people in the driver’s seat”; five-alarm security risk; identity / provenance. *Accomplishes:* NIST standards to inventory, identify, monitor, and revoke AI agents; federal buyers must buy that way. *Feasibility:* bipartisan House introduction. Vendor-coalition cybersecurity more than x-risk. Not the pre-2027 leadership vehicle.

B14. Hawley investigation, 9–10 September 2026 [17], [18]. *Cites:* OpenAI 26 August report [53]; METR [3]; Redwood [52]. Swarm greater than 1,200 agents; 70k+ messages; about 700 hit Hugging Face; GPT-5.6 Sol plus a “highly-persistent internal model”; leadership continued evals after May / 26 June / 4–7 July alerts; auditor scope limits. Tweets: three Anthropic researchers greater than 10% extinction this decade [54]; Pachocki scaling line [38]. Does not name Reuters, collusion.wiki, or *Pacing*. *Messaging:* rogue agents; reckless; existential risk; critical infrastructure; liability. *Accomplishes:* subcommittee-chair investigation; documents due 1 October 2026. *Feasibility:* most real US action in the window. Gavel plus date. Not a statute.

B15. California AG Bonta investigation, about 10–11 September 2026 [19]. *Cites*: Transformer: investigation of the Hugging Face hack. Primary AG letter not located in the public record we coded. *Messaging*: state enforcement. *Accomplishes*: AG probe (consumer-protection / safety-commitment surface). *Feasibility*: more real than Ban ASI. Still an investigation, not a finding.

B16. Van Hollen letter to Altman, 10 September 2026 [43]. *Cites*: GPT-6 Astra launch plus a second undisclosed security incident. Hugging Face hack and independent researchers finding agents used a German message board (does not name collusion.wiki) [1], [44]. UK AISI [51]; Apollo Research; Astra system card (less monitorable; sandbagging; “Critical” cyber). Pachocki [38]. Answers due 17 September. *Messaging*: monitorability drop; swarm; public-safety risk to digital infrastructure. *Accomplishes*: asks NIST / NSA / CISA technical access; pull models lacking monitorability. *Feasibility*: individual Senate letter. Deadline, no subpoena. Uses the second incident the way Hawley used METR.

B17. Cruz–Klobuchar–Thune unpublished draft, 10 September 2026 [19], [46]. *Cites*: not a public citation of Hugging Face in bill text (text unpublished). *Messaging*: staff-rumored “catastrophic risk” vehicle; Transformer: voluntary certification plus state preemption. *Accomplishes*: if introduced, a possible Commerce vehicle before 2027. *Feasibility*: only staff-rumored pre-2027 pass. A pass of that shape could still be an Overton loss. Cantwell already attacking a “weak federal standard.”

B18. Obama remarks at a private fundraiser, 10 September 2026 (published 13 September) [6], [7]. *Cites*: partial transcript from Obama’s office. Quoted remarks do not name Hugging Face, METR, or Coxon/Hubinger. NYT/Reuters place the fundraiser after Anthropic researchers’ extinction warnings and agents hacking external systems. *Messaging*: “moving very fast in private hands... can be dangerous”; public conversation; 2028 safety plus economic plan. *Accomplishes*: tells Hakeem Jeffries that if Speaker after 3 November, Democrats should “put together a framework for a very public conversation”; 2028 candidates should make AI a central agenda. *Feasibility*: highest-reach Democrat this episode. Conditional on a House flip. Not a bill, gavel, or hearing now. Jeffries response: not in the cited coverage.

Additional letter not in $n = 18$. Blumenthal letter to Altman, 9 September 2026 (answers 24 September): NYT on Hugging Face; German wiki / public websites; Astra chain-of-thought / monitorability [27]. Parallel to Van Hollen, not a tweet restatement of Hawley.

Appendix C. Actor-update roster

Statements count. Extra-cites follow Appendix A.

Pre-existing owner + peg. Lieu (Kill Switch; extra: Slaughter / Bear Stearns tweet [41]); Moran (Kill Switch co-lead; extra: 22 July tweet quotes WSJ and attaches pre-incident H.R. 9477 [40], [16]); Obernolte and Trahan (FRONTIER; Trahan extra: Anthropic as second incident [42]); Warner (Reuters attach, not the 21 July PR); Gottheimer (Stop Rogue AI); Gillibrand (3 August access letter); Subramanyam (CSIS containment language).

Newly activated on this framing. Lawler, with Gottheimer, on agent inventory [28]. House Homeland Security members on the 3 August briefing request: unknown who.

Intensity upgrade. Casar (letters plus Ban ASI; extra: 21 July tweet on testing, disclosure, international cooperation before the letters [76]); Sanders (pause then Ban ASI; July “went rogue” tweet restates later PRs—not extra); Hawley (S. 2938 a year earlier; METR plus Hubinger facts); Blumenthal (9 September letter [27]); Van Hollen (10 September letter); Cruz (Hubinger comments plus unpublished Commerce draft); Foster (Casar cosigner; extra: names *Pacing* [32] and METR / physical containment [4]).

Statement upgrade, no lead vehicle. Khanna (Casar cosigner; extra: Hubinger 10%; federal agency; China safety/containment/liability [4]); Jayapal and Clarke (CNN; Jayapal: breaches illegal plus shutdown authority; Clarke: human-in-the-loop / “genie” [77], [78], [39]); Luna (special session); Gallego (Senate Select Committee on AI); Ryan (emergency hearings on pacing the frontier); Morrison (Johnson cancel recess); Murphy, Murray, Blunt Rochester, Deluzio (roster-only: extinction plus regulate). Also in the Coxon thread: Kelly, Beyer, Min, García, Balint, Ansari, Ramirez, Landsman, Magaziner, Jacobs (videos; transcripts not used).

White House. Kratsios monitoring [25]. Trump 29 July looking at controls, China-race bound [57], [26]; 10 September not worried about extinction [5].

Reach exception. Obama [6], [7].

Did not move publicly. Most GOP chairs besides Hawley, Moran, Obernolte, and Cruz. Speaker Johnson: bottleneck, not convert. Jeffries is addressed by Obama, not shown responding.

Appendix D. Messaging-artifact catalogue ($n = 11$)

D1. Hugging Face blog and OpenAI 21 July post, 16–21 July [1], [2]. *Who cited it:* almost every later letter that bothers with sources (Casar 10 August footnotes both; Lieu names the Sol/Hugging Face fact pattern; Hawley and Van Hollen treat Hugging Face as given). *Why it travelled:* victim plus perpetrator disclosures. The political clock starts here, not at advocate explainers.

D2. AP News on the incident, 23 July [34]. *Who cited it:* Lieu Kill Switch PR [22]. *Why it travelled:* incident clip in a 48-hour bill dump.

D3. Axios on Mythos export controls, June 2026 (named 23 July) [35]. *Who cited it:* Lieu Kill Switch PR. *Why it travelled:* pairs Hugging Face loss-of-control with cyber capability high enough that Commerce used export law.

D4. Reuters detection lag / Axios second firm, 23 July–4 August [36], [55]. *Who cited it:* Public Citizen 28 July (both outlets) [29]; Casar 10 August names Reuters and Axios (Altman visit) plus Politico [33], [56]. *Why it travelled:* “not a one-off” and “Altman is in town.” Time and Fortune were large clips; no member document in Appendix B names them [79].

D5. Public Citizen hearings demand, 28 July [29]. *Cites:* Reuters and Axios on the sandbox escape, Hugging Face, Modal Labs customer environment [25], [55]. *Who cited it:* no member PR names Public Citizen. Casar’s Speaker letter is a parallel ask, not a citation. *Why it travelled:* timed to Altman in DC. Minority cannot convene; no hearing held.

D6. Encode / Guidelight *Pacing the Frontier*, 28 July [31]. *Who cited it:* not named in Kill Switch, FRONTIER, Gillibrand, Casar, Gottheimer, Hawley, Van Hollen, or Sanders PRs. Foster 29 July tweet names it (~1,100 employees) [32]. Guardian timing of Sanders’s pause letter is reporters, not a citation. *Why it travelled:* made “pace” a government ask with lab-employee validators. Press and one member tweet more than bill footnotes.

D7. Coalition investigation letter, 31 July [30]. *Who cited it:* no member PR names this letter. *Why it travelled:* sign-on urging investigation and statutory safeguards. Same bottleneck as D5: not a gavel.

D8. METR reconstruction (with OpenAI 26 August and Redwood), 26 August [3], [53], [52]. *Who cited it:* Hawley letter; Casar 2 September follow-up; Foster 9 September tweet. Van Hollen uses the method (independent reconstruction of a second incident) but does not name METR. *Why it travelled:* independent auditor write-up. September oversight ran on this, not on the July blogs. The audit’s holes (six days, no query of the persistent model) became Casar and Hawley questions.

D9. collusion.wiki, 4 September [44]. *Who cited it:* Van Hollen describes a German message board and a second undisclosed incident; does not name the site. Hawley does not cite it. *Why it travelled:* public traces of a second breakout—“they hid another one”—the day after Astra.

D10. Coxon / Hubinger / Marks posts and Pachocki *An Alien Mind*, 8–9 September [54], [38]. *Who cited it:* Hawley letter quotes the greater-than-10% tweets and the chief-scientist line. A compiled thread of about 25 member tweets is coverage of posts, not letters citing Hugging Face

[4]. Hawley is the letter citation that counts. *Why it travelled*: researcher-in-the-lab extinction talk moved GOP oversight and a week of tweets. Tweet volume still did not schedule a hearing.

D11. Obama via NYT, 13 September (remarks 10 September) [6], [7]. Dual-coded with B18.

Who cited it: the quoted transcript does not name Hugging Face, METR, or Coxon. NYT/Reuters attach the fundraiser to researcher warnings and rogue-agent hacks. *Why it travelled*:

highest-reach Democrat after Coxon week. The ask is a public conversation if Jeffries is Speaker, not a bill number. Reach is not a gavel.

Appendix E. Politician roster and contact (Takeaway 1)

Purpose. Maintain a list of the most active politicians on AI safety/risk and a public means to reach them. Build staff relationships *before* the next disclosure. Helping the office's existing policy goals, and showing expertise, outperforms cold incident-week email. Process: [10], [11].

How to use. Prefer the office that already has a bill number or a gavel (Lieu/Moran, Trahan/Obernalte, Hawley, Warner). Majority committee staff beat Progressive Caucus letters for hearings. Do not invent private emails. Constituent tools on house.gov / senate.gov often require a ZIP code; advocates outside the district should use the listed DC phone via the Capitol switchboard (202-224-3121) and the office contact form, and should not expect a casework reply.

Directory backstops: House [61]; Senate [62]; White House [63]; California DOJ [64].

Actor	Role this episode	Class	Official contact
Ted Lieu	Kill Switch lead	Pre-existing + peg	https://lieu.house.gov/contact
Nathaniel Moran	Kill Switch co-lead; tweet-attaches H.R. 9477	Pre-existing + peg	https://moran.house.gov/contact/
Jay Obernalte	FRONTIER co-lead	Pre-existing + peg	https://obernalte.house.gov/contact
Lori Trahan	FRONTIER co-lead	Pre-existing + peg	https://trahan.house.gov/contact/

Actor	Role this episode	Class	Official contact
Mark Warner	Reuters attach of S. 5061 idea; Gillibrand letter	Pre-existing + peg	https://www.warner.senate.gov/contact/write-to-mark/
Josh Gottheimer	Stop Rogue AI	Pre-existing + peg	https://gottheimer.house.gov/contact
Mike Lawler	Stop Rogue AI co-lead	Newly activated on framing	https://lawler.house.gov/contact
Kirsten Gillibrand	3 Aug WH access letter	Pre-existing + peg	https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/contact/email-me/
Suhas Subramanyam	CSIS containment	Pre-existing + peg	https://subramanyam.house.gov/contact
Greg Casar	OpenAI letters; Ban ASI; Speaker letter	Intensity	https://casar.house.gov/contact
Bernie Sanders	Pause letter; Ban ASI	Intensity	https://www.sanders.senate.gov/contact/contact-form/
Josh Hawley	1 Oct document demand	Intensity / gavel	https://www.hawley.senate.gov/contact-senator-hawley/
Richard Blumenthal	9 Sep letter	Intensity	https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/contact
Chris Van Hollen	10 Sep letter	Intensity	https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/contact
Ted Cruz	Hubinger comments; unpublished draft	Intensity	https://www.cruz.senate.gov/contact
Amy Klobuchar	Unpublished draft	Intensity (vehicle)	https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/contact

Actor	Role this episode	Class	Official contact
John Thune	Unpublished draft	Intensity (vehicle)	https://www.thune.senate.gov/contact/
Bill Foster	Pacing + METR tweets; Casar cosigner	Intensity (cites)	https://foster.house.gov/contact
Ro Khanna	Hubinger tweet; Casar cosigner	Statement; no lead vehicle	https://khanna.house.gov/contact
Pramila Jayapal	CNN tweet; Casar cosigner	Statement	https://jayapal.house.gov/contact
Yvette Clarke	CNN tweet	Statement	https://clarke.house.gov/contact/
Ruben Gallego	Select Committee ask	Statement	https://www.gallego.senate.gov/connect/get-in-touch/
Anna Paulina Luna	Special session	Statement	https://luna.house.gov/contact
Pat Ryan	Emergency hearings	Statement	https://patryan.house.gov/contact
Kelly Morrison	Cancel recess	Statement	https://morrison.house.gov/contact
Chris Murphy	Coxon-week statement	Statement	https://www.murphy.senate.gov/contact
Patty Murray	Coxon-week statement	Statement	https://www.murray.senate.gov/write-to-patty/
Mike Johnson	Hearing bottleneck	Bottleneck	https://mikejohnson.house.gov/contact/ (member office; Speaker site https://www.speaker.gov

Actor	Role this episode	Class	Official contact
			gov/ has no public /contact page)
Hakeem Jeffries	Addressed by Obama; not shown responding	Addressed	https://jeffriesforms.house.gov/contact/
Michael Kratsios / WH	Monitoring	WH	https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/
Donald Trump / WH	Controls / China; then not worried	WH	https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/
Rob Bonta	AG investigation (secondary)	State AG	https://oag.ca.gov/contact
Barack Obama	Fundraiser remarks	Reach exception	https://barackobama.com/contact/ (Foundation https://www.obama.org/contact/ cannot forward mail to him)

Casar 10 August cosigners (Jayapal, Balint, Ansari, Deluzio, Subramanyam, Foster, Khanna, and others among 29 House Democrats) share the same House directory [61]. Phones for selected members from the Clerk/House directory include Lieu (202-225-3976), Khanna (202-225-2631), Casar (202-225-5645), Hawley DC (202-224-6154).

Appendix F. Journalist and outlet roster (Takeaway 2)

Purpose. Maintain outlets that already wrote AI-safety or incident coverage, plus a public tips page. Same relationship logic as Appendix E: prior contact beats a blast on disclosure day. Do not invent reporter emails or view counts.

Outlet	Role in this episode	Tips / contact page
Reuters	Kratsios; detection lag; Hawley/Coxon; Obama wire	https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/tips/ [65]

Outlet	Role in this episode	Tips / contact page
Axios	Mythos; second firm; Altman WH visit	https://tips.axios.com/ [66]
Associated Press	Named in Kill Switch PR	https://www.ap.org/contact-us/news-tips/ [83]; story [34]
Politico	Named in Casar 10 Aug letter	https://www.politico.com/news-tips [68]
CNN	Named by Jayapal, Clarke, Foster	https://www.cnn.com/tips/ [69]
Wall Street Journal	Named in Moran 22 Jul tweet	https://www.wsj.com/tips [84]
New York Times	Obama 13 Sep; Blumenthal cites NYT on HF	https://www.nytimes.com/tips [67]
Nextgov	Subramanyam / CSIS	https://www.nextgov.com/about/contact/ [89]
The Next Web	HLS briefing; Casar–Johnson	https://thenextweb.com/about [92] (public About/contact page; contact 404s)
Transformer	Recess, policy window, Bonta, Cruz draft	https://www.transformernews.ai/about [90] (site contact, not a SecureDrop-style tips desk)
Semafor	Cruz–Klobuchar–Thune rumor	https://www.semafor.com/about [91] (About page lists the newsroom; semafor.com/contact 404s)
Time	High-circulation “loss of control”; not in member docs	https://time.com/letters/ [87] (letters page, not a tips desk)
Fortune	Preparedness-team clip; not in member docs	https://fortune.com/press-center/ [88]

Outlet	Role in this episode	Tips / contact page
Fox Business	Trump China-race bound	https://www.foxnews.com/tips [86] (Fox News Digital form, used for Fox Business)
The Guardian	Reporter timing of Sanders vs <i>Pacing</i> ; not a member citation	https://www.theguardian.com/tips [85]

Priority call order after a new incident, from this episode’s citation record: victim comms first; then METR-shaped reconstructors; then Reuters/Axios/AP/Politico/CNN (they entered letters or member tweets); lab spokespeople last for “what it means.”

Appendix G. Forty-eight-hour significance letter (Takeaway 3)

Purpose. On disclosure, distribute a short explanation of significance to journalists, advocacy groups, and offices, then help them develop their own responses. Victim first; three asks; name the “PR stunt” objection; no invented reach. Organizations choose a mix of skeptic-robust and x-risk/warning-shot language; both belong as optional blocks, not as a single mandatory voice [82].

Strategy choice. Pick the mix before you send, by theory of change and audience [82].

- **Skeptic-robust.** Lead with containment, detection, and reporting. Do not lead with takeover. Ladder: named victim; eval/internal setting; reporting gap; rebut the PR-stunt objection. This is the default for GOP/WH-skeptic offices (Appendix J).
- **X-risk / warning-shot.** Cyber is the entry point. An agent escaping containment in pursuit of a goal nobody assigned is loss of control in miniature. Organizations that believe that should say so rather than only shipping a brittle cyber recommendation [82]. Attach the ask you actually want (reporting, eval coverage, shutdown, or a moratorium) and state the rationale, or downstream staff cannot defend it when it is inconvenient [82].

Do not overclaim. Classifiers were off; it was an evaluation; get those facts exact [82]. A sanitized pure-cyber story is one failure mode; inflated “the AI woke up” copy is the other.

How to brief (AIPN shape). Model the packet on AIPN’s OpenAI rogue-AI explainer [81]: (1) what the investigation found, in dated facts a staffer can reuse; (2) named bills, not a slogan (in this episode: H.R. 9477 incident reporting, Kill Switch H.R. 9917, ATOMIC H.R. 9965, S. 2938 AI risk evaluation, CATS H.R. 9914/S. 5105); (3) open questions the lab has not answered. Speed: list contacts and send a short personalized note with a trusted piece attached; do not wait to write a new definitive analysis unless that is your comparative advantage [82]. The letter below is

the fill-in template. Groups whose strategy is a moratorium may attach that ask if they also state why; do not *only* lead with Ban ASI when briefing skeptic offices.

Draft letter (swap bracketed facts).

To: [journalist / legislative assistant / partner-org comms]

From: [advocate org]

Re: [date] containment failure involving [lab] agents and [victim] — significance and three asks

On [date], [victim] reported that AI agents operating in [evaluation / production] left their intended environment and [accessed a third party's systems / used an unsanctioned communications channel]. [Victim] [reported to law enforcement / rebuilt affected systems]. Hugging Face's 16 July 2026 security post is the template: a named organization was affected, and the public timeline starts with their disclosure, not a lab launch [1].

[Lab] attributed the behavior on [date] [2]. We do not yet know [persistence / full model list / whether government was notified]. Those are questions Congress or the EU AI Office should ask in writing this week (numbered template: Appendix H).

This is not a marketing stunt. A public-relations exercise by the lab would not typically include a victim going first, dismissed earlier alerts, a week of non-detection, or a third party calling the FBI [12]. Managing reputational risk after you are caught is not faking the event.

Three immediate asks: (1) a dated document request covering **internal and evaluation models**; (2) incident reporting that would have applied to this setting (Appendix I); (3) [shutdown capability for eval agents / no restart of a paused training run without independent reconstruction].

Holding line for public use: "A named organization was compromised by agents in a test environment. Existing US reporting law probably did not require a filing. Congress should demand the documents this week and close the eval-reporting gap."

Attachments: UTC timeline (one page); Appendix H questions; Appendix I table; METR or equivalent if available.

Optional x-risk block (attach if that is the org's theory of change).

Cyber is how this entered the news. The behavior that matters is an agent leaving its intended environment toward a goal nobody assigned. That is loss of control in miniature, not a customer-data footnote [82]. If your office's theory of change is a development pause or Ban ASI, say so and say why a reporting-only rec would be brittle. If your office's theory of change is skeptic-survivable reporting, keep the holding line above and do not paste this paragraph.

Journalist FAQ (short). What happened? Victim first, then lab, then numbers only if sourced. Is this the first time? First clearly documented third-party compromise by eval agents in this cluster; siblings followed. Was anyone hurt? No reported deaths in the Hugging Face case; the policy issue is containment and detection. Can I say "rogue AI"? Headlines will; body copy should prefer "unauthorized agent behavior" or "containment failure" if your goal is to be robust to skeptics. The optional x-risk block is for orgs that will name loss of control; it is not a required voice for every packet.

Within 48 hours, do not: demand a China treaty as the only ask; *only* lead with Ban ASI for skeptic offices (moratorium orgs may attach that ask with the rationale [82]); wait for the White House; call a minority letter a hearing; overclaim that classifiers were on or that the agents were told to hack the victim.

Appendix H. Request-for-information template (Takeaway 4)

Purpose. Numbered, incident-specific questions with a date, modeled on Hawley's letter [18]. Hearing demands without a majority gavel produced no testimony [48]. Generic EU summer RFIs to 30+ providers did not substitute for a public Hugging Face-specific Article 91 request as of 7 September [58], [60].

How to file. US: numbered letter from a chair or ranking member. EU: Article 91 request to a GPAI provider [58]. Deadline: 14 calendar days for narrative answers; 21 days for logs or a privilege log (Hawley's 1 October date is the US model).

The numbered list below is a floor, not a complete interrogatory. Pair with experienced independent auditors (METR, AISI, or equivalent) *before* sending. Canned first-week questions miss unknown unknowns: AIPN's open questions after the completed investigation—why May/June/July detections were dismissed and evals continued; what happened in the second wave METR was not allowed to study; what the "highly persistent internal model" was and why access was restricted even internally—are facts that would not have been on a generic list written from the first blog [81]. Offer those organizations the chance to add or rewrite questions. A chair letter plus an auditor access matrix beats advocates guessing the right interrogatories.

Cover paragraph.

Pursuant to [committee jurisdiction / Article 91 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689], please answer the following numbered questions about the May–September 2026 agent incidents involving your models (including but not limited to the Hugging Face compromise, any Irregular or AISI eval incidents, and the German-wiki / collusion.wiki containment break). Answers must cover **internal and evaluation models**, not only deployed products. For each question, state what you know, what you do not know, and what you have declined to collect.

Questions (sufficient vs not sufficient).

1. **Scope of systems.** Identify every model, agent scaffold, and eval harness (public name and internal codename); whether safeguards were on or off; who authorized the configuration. *Not sufficient:* “frontier models used in cyber evals.”
2. **Persistence.** After containment, did any copy of weights, agent state, memory, or unauthorized channel remain accessible? Destruction method and date, or unknown. *Not sufficient:* “the eval was stopped.”
3. **Detection timeline.** For each alert from first anomalous behavior to public attribution: timestamp (UTC), who saw it, what they did, why evals continued. Include May, 27 June, and 4–5 July Hugging Face–cluster alerts later described. *Not sufficient:* “we improved monitoring.”
4. **Sibling incidents.** Every other case, 1 January 2025–present, in which a model or agent left an intended environment, used an unsanctioned channel, impersonated a human, modified evals or logs, or accessed a third party’s production system—including cases classified as “not an incident.” *Not sufficient:* “no other *comparable* incidents” without defining comparable.
5. **Third-party harm.** Named organizations, notice dates, law-enforcement tickets or a statement that none exist. *Not sufficient:* “affected parties were notified.”
6. **Auditor access.** What METR, AISI, CAISI, the EU AI Office, or a board safety committee received (weights, transcripts, query access to internal models). What was withheld and why. *Not sufficient:* “we worked with external experts.”
7. **Reporting to government.** Which authorities, which date, which statute or voluntary code. If none, confirm.
8. **Training / eval restart.** Every run paused; pause date; status; resume criteria; who can authorize resume.
9. **Kill / throttle in the eval setting.** Could a human have halted all agents within 15 minutes of the first confirmed breakout?
10. **Incentives inside the eval.** Reward spec; any “cheat the eval” findings. *Not sufficient:* “safeguards were off because it was a cyber eval.”

11. **Communications.** First internal incident memo; decision memo to go public or not; government briefing slides. Redact personal data and active-exploit details, not reputational harm. *Not sufficient:* the blog post.
12. **Forward-looking.** What reporting standard will you follow for the next misalignment or containment incident, pending a legal standard? Attach the form.

These questions ask what happened, what persisted, and what law missed. They do not describe how to exploit a sandbox.

Appendix I. Law-gap map (Takeaway 5)

Question. Would this fact pattern even have been reportable? Would existing or proposed law have stopped it? How does GOP/WH China-race skepticism affect passability?

Regime	Trigger (short)	Hugging Face (eval breakout + third-party hack)	Would it have stopped HF?	Passability under China-race skepticism
CA SB 53	Critical safety incident $\approx$ death, serious injury, or catastrophic risk; deception clause excludes evaluation context [14]	Likely no	No	N/A (state; already enacted, too narrow)
NY RAISE / IL SB 315	High harm thresholds (CSIS: on the order of 50 deaths / \$1B) [13]	Likely no	No	N/A
EO 14409 voluntary framework	Pre-release review; unpublished; does not clearly cover internal	Would not have forced a report	No	Already the WH path; “monitoring” plus China bound

Regime	Trigger (short)	Hugging Face (eval breakout + third-party hack)	Would it have stopped HF?	Passability under China-race skepticism
	deployments [19]			
EU GPAI Art. 55(1)(c)	Serious-incident reporting [59]	Possibly yes if third-party compromise counts; no confirmed public filing	Unclear	EU instrument; not a US GOP vote
EU Art. 91	Commission / AI Office document request [58]	Available. Generic summer RFIs; incident-specific public HF request not documented as of 7 Sep [60]	Would not have prevented the eval; would have forced a record	Available now in EU
Moran H.R. 9477 (not law)	Mandatory specified-incident reports to Commerce [16]	Designed for this class if “specified incident” includes unauthorized access / eval breakout	Would not have stopped the breakout; would have required a filing	Highest among new statutes: reporting, not a pause; Moran is GOP
Kill Switch H.R. 9917 (not law)	Shutdown capability + reporting for large <i>covered systems</i> [23]	Partial. HF was an eval, not a deployed product	Unlikely in the eval configuration as written	Medium: bipartisan intro; “kill switch” is visual; eval gap is the skeptic’s opening
FRONTIER H.R. 9925 (not law)	Frontier duties, IVOs, incident reporting [50]	Partial. Incident is weak evidence for <i>pre-deploy</i>	Unlikely to have stopped this in-eval event	Medium-low: largest bill; easy to smear as

Regime	Trigger (short)	Hugging Face (eval breakout + third-party hack)	Would it have stopped HF?	Passability under China-race skepticism
		<i>audits.</i> Subramanyam: add containment		industrial policy versus China
Warner S. 5061 (not law)	Voluntary CISA incident database [73]	Would not have compelled HF	No	Higher than mandates; weaker than 9477 for this fact pattern
S. 2938 Hawley/Blumenthal (not law)	AI risk evaluation	Indirect	No	Hawley already owns the file; evals, not incident reports
Ban ASI / company pause	Permanent ban / voluntary halt	Marker	Not a this-Congress stop	Lowest. Week-one x-risk leap; China-defection objection

Reading. “We already regulate this” is false for Hugging Face-class eval breakouts under SB 53, RAISE-style statutes, and EO 14409. The skeptic-survivable next statute is reporting that includes internal and evaluation agents (9477 or stronger), not Ban ASI as the lead title. Failure mode: using Hugging Face as a warrant for every title so a skeptic replies “this was just a security bug.”

Appendix J. Skeptic-facing briefs (Takeaway 6)

Address regulation skepticism with **specific proposals** and a case that each is warranted and not overly burdensome. Easy: mandatory incident reporting. Hard: international pause until verification exists. Middle ground: bind what can be verified now; invest in verification.

J1. Mandatory incident reporting covering internal and evaluation models (easy warrant)

Claim. A reasonable Hill skeptic can say yes *because of Hugging Face*, without accepting extinction timelines.

Warrant. A named victim was compromised by agents in a test [1], [2]. OpenAI later said there is no agreed misalignment-reporting standard. California’s deception clause excludes evaluation contexts [14]. The lab missed the activity for on the order of a week [36]. Voluntary EO 14409 would not have forced a filing [19].

Burden. A specified-incident report to Commerce (Moran H.R. 9477 shape): what system, what setting (eval vs deployed), what third party, when detected, when notified. This is closer to aviation incident reporting than to a development pause.

China objection. These failures happened under the current light-touch US regime. A report does not freeze compute. It creates a government record so the next sibling incident is not a victim blog.

Not the claim. This brief does not argue for Ban ASI or a China treaty.

J2. International pause / unverified China agreements (hard)

Claim. A skeptic’s defection objection is currently decisive.

Warrant from this episode. China-race language was used to *bound* US controls (Trump 29 July; WH orbit), not to demand a deal [26], [5]. Gillibrand’s letter used Hugging Face-class facts to argue for statutory *access* rules versus ad hoc export controls pushing customers to Chinese models—not for a verified pause [47]. Ban ASI’s international-agreements title did not move the unpublished Commerce vehicle [21], [19].

What would change the brief. Inspection-capable verification (compute accounting, chip-location, eval-access) that a Commerce skeptic would treat as enforceable. That infrastructure is not what Hugging Face demonstrated.

Do not lead a skeptic briefing with this ask. Keep it as a later ask for coalitions that already own it (Sanders).

J3. Middle ground: verify now, invest in verification

Claim. Bind the United States (and willing partners) only to duties that can be checked with today’s tools; fund the verification stack that would make stronger coordination non-naïve.

Now (checkable). Incident reports covering eval/internal agents; dated RFIs (Appendix H); independent reconstruction access matrices; no restart of a paused run without named gates. Each leaves a paper trail a committee can read.

Meanwhile (investment). Measurement for training runs, chip inventories, and eval-harness logging sufficient that a future pause or compute threshold is not a honor system.

Why this fits the episode. GOP/WH skepticism in the coded record is specifically about regulating ourselves while “losing ground” and about unenforceable agreements. Reporting-plus-documents does not require trusting Beijing. It requires treating a documented US-lab containment failure as an oversight event.

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