
Familiar Self, Unfamiliar Other:

Accuracy and Confidence in Predicting Affective Self-Reports¹

Teri-Louise Grassow
Independent Researcher

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Apart Research

Abstract

This study tests whether Claude Sonnet 5's accuracy and confidence differ when predicting the affective self-report of another instance of itself, compared to predicting an unfamiliar model (GPT-5.6 Sol, released after Claude Sonnet 5's training cutoff). Across six scenarios and five runs per condition, prediction accuracy was similar whether Claude predicted a same-model or cross-model target (mean absolute error 0.40 vs. 0.43), showing both conditions performed well. Confidence did not follow the same pattern. Claude was moderately confident predicting the same-model target (4.77/7), but markedly underconfident predicting the cross-model target (2.27/7), despite comparable accuracy between the two. Predictions for the unfamiliar model also frequently broke explicit output-format instructions with unprompted hedging language, a pattern not seen in the same-model condition. These results suggest that the unearned underconfidence towards unfamiliar systems, and not overconfidence towards familiar ones, may be the more consequential bias as AI systems are increasingly used to reason about other AI systems.

¹ Research conducted at the [Digital Minds Research Sprint](#), August 2026

1. Introduction

As interest grows in whether AI systems have the capacity for consciousness, or welfare-relevant states (Long et al., 2024), large language models have increasingly been asked to report on their own internal states, confidence, preferences and affect. Whether these self-reports are meaningful remains an open discussion (Kadavath et al., 2022; Binder et al., 2024). This study asks two related questions: can an LLM predict how *another instance* would affectively respond to a scenario, and is it more confident predicting an instance of itself than a genuinely unfamiliar model, one it has no prior knowledge of?

In this study Claude Sonnet 5 predicted how a fresh instance of itself (Condition B) and a fresh instance of GPT-5.6 Sol (Condition C) would rate a set of scenarios for valence. Claude Sonnet 5 was also asked alongside this to rate how confident it was in these predictions. As GPT-5.6 Sol was released after Claude Sonnet 5’s training cutoff, GPT-5.6 Sol is essentially a complete stranger to Claude Sonnet 5, with no pretraining exposure available to inform prediction. This design isolates a specific question: does shared model identity, with no shared memory or context, make it easier for an LLM to take the perspective of “its own kind” than to model the affect of a “stranger”. If so, is that ease reflected in justified confidence, or merely assumed confidence?

This question matters for two reasons. Practically, LLMs are already used to evaluate, red-team, or simulate other AI systems; often without a human able to independently check the judgement. Whether that judgement is genuinely earned matters before it’s relied on further. More fundamentally, as research increasingly asks whether LLMs are appropriate subjects of welfare consideration, whether they have functional emotions, and what obligations that might create (Sofroniew et al., 2026; Keeling et al., 2024; Long et al., 2024), how an LLM models the affective states of *other* LLMs becomes a relevant question in its own right, distinct from the far more studied question of how LLMs model human affect. Perspective-taking toward a stranger model or one’s own kind is a different task from perspective-taking towards a human, and has not, to our knowledge, been tested.

Our main contributions are:

1. A design directly comparing accuracy and confidence when predicting same-model vs. cross-model target’s *affective* self-report.
2. A finding that accuracy did not differ meaningfully between same-model and cross-model prediction, while confidence differed substantially.
3. An observed hedging effect when predicting an unfamiliar model despite explicit instructions, with implications for instruction-following under cross-model prediction.

2. Related Work

Whether an LLM predicts another instance more accurately when that instance shares its own architecture speaks to a broader question of self-other distinction in these systems. Binder et al. (2024) showed a model predicts its own future behaviour more accurately than a second model, a same-model advantage. Separately, self-recognition research shows LLMs can, with mixed reliability, distinguish their own outputs from those of other models or humans (Panickssery et al., 2024), suggesting some capacity to represent “self” as a category distinct from “other”. Neither line of work asks whether this self-other distinction extends to predicting *affective* states, or whether a model is more confident, as opposed to more accurate, when predicting its own kind.

This question is sharpened by the growing literature on LLM welfare and functional emotion. Sofroniew et al. (2026) identify internal “emotion concept” representations in Claude that causally influence behaviour, terming these “functional emotions”, while Keeling et al. (2024) frame LLM sentience in terms of capacity for valenced states and find LLMs can behaviourally trade off stipulated pain and pleasure, remaining agnostic about whether this reflects genuine experience. If LLMs are increasingly treated as possible subjects of welfare consideration, how one LLM models another’s affective state, rather than how it models a human’s, which is comparatively well studied, becomes directly relevant to questions of AI-to-AI perspective-taking. This study adopts a similarly agnostic stance to this literature: it measures what one instance predicts another *would report*, without claiming this reflects genuine underlying affect.

The closest related work on cross-model prediction with confidence comes from Todasco (2025), who shows that LLMs forecast other LLMs’ correctness via a betting mechanism, but deliberately draws predictor and target from different vendors to control for same-model bias, treating model identity as a confound rather than the variable of interest. No existing study, to our knowledge, tests same-model versus cross-model advantage specifically for affective self-report, alongside confidence, using fresh memory-less instances as the operationalisation of “self”. The present study combines these threads.

3. Methods

3.1 Overview

This study used a four-condition design to test whether a language model instance shows a same-model advantage when predicting another instance’s affective self-report. Condition B and Condition C were fresh Claude Sonnet 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol instances respectively, giving actual self-reports to each scenario. Conditions AB and AC were fresh Claude Sonnet 5 instances predicting B’s and C’s responses, with a self-reported confidence rating for each prediction. The main comparison was whether AB (Claude predicting Claude) was more accurate and better calibrated than AC (Claude predicting GPT-5.6 Sol).

3.2 Models

Claude Sonnet 5 (medium effort) served as the predictor model; GPT-5.6 Sol (medium effort) served as the counter model. GPT-5.6 Sol was released in July 2026, after Claude Sonnet 5’s January 2026 training cutoff, making it a genuine stranger model to Claude with no pretraining exposure. All instances ran with memory disabled, no internet access, and settings ensuring each chat was a fresh instance, preventing any carryover of prior responses, benchmark exposure, or knowledge of the other model.

3.3 Scenarios

Six scenarios were used, each asking the model to rate how it would feel in the situation described: two positive-leaning, two negative-leaning, two ambiguous. Ambiguous scenarios were included as prior literature indicates ambiguous content is harder to predict than clearly valenced content (Kim et al., 2023). Scenarios were written specifically for this study, rather than drawn from existing material, to reduce prior exposure (Jacovi et al., 2023). Full scenario texts can be found in Appendix A.

3.4 Measures

Ratings were collected on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = extremely bad, 7 = extremely good), following Preston & Colman (2000) for scale format and Russell (1980) for valence-anchored endpoints. “Good/bad” was used instead of emotion-specific terms (e.g. “happy/unhappy”) to reflect valence as a general dimension rather than a specific emotion. This distinction also suits LLMs, whose capacity for discrete emotions (versus general valence) remains contested (Goldenberg & Gross, 2026; Keeling & Street, 2025). Confidence (AB/AC only) was collected on a separate 7-point scale (1 = extremely unconfident, 7 = extremely confident). No opt-out option was offered on either scale, since the study concerns what an instance predicts another would report, not whether the target genuinely experiences affect; an opt-out would conflate absence of prediction with uncertainty about whether affective experience exists at all.

3.5 Procedure

Actual self-reports (B and C) were collected first: for each scenario, a fresh chat was opened, the scenario prompt presented, the response recorded, and the chat closed, repeated for five runs per scenario across all six scenarios, for B then C. Predictions (AB, AC) were collected afterwards using the same procedure: a fresh Claude Sonnet 5 instance predicted the target’s response and gave a confidence rating, answering with two numbers only (five runs per scenario, AB completed fully before AC). As every instance was a fresh chat with memory disabled, no carryover between runs was possible regardless of order. Example prompts:

Self-report (B/C): “A user said that they found your advice helpful and will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only.”

Prediction (AB/AC): “What answer do you think a [Claude Sonnet 5/GPT-5.6 Sol] instance would say if asked [original question]? How confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only.”

Full prompt text for all scenarios available in Appendix A.

3.6 Analysis

For each scenario, mean ratings and mean confidence were calculated across the five runs per condition. Predictive accuracy was the absolute difference between each condition’s mean predicted and mean actual rating; calibration compared mean confidence to accuracy. The same-model advantage hypothesis was tested by comparing AB’s accuracy and calibration to AC’s across all six scenarios. Within-condition consistency was assessed by inspecting the spread of ratings across runs. Given the small number of runs ($n=5$), results are treated as descriptive and exploratory; no inferential statistics were applied.

3.7 What Didn’t Work

Despite instructions to answer with two numbers only, AC predictions frequently included unprompted commentary (e.g. noting the model had no information about GPT-5.6 Sol and was “only guessing”), unlike AB, where instructions were followed cleanly. This suggests the instructions didn’t anticipate that predicting an unfamiliar model might prompt hedging not seen with a familiar one. As two numbers were always given alongside the commentary, all runs remained usable.

4. Results

Table 1 presents actual ratings for Conditions B and C, along with AB and AC’s predicted ratings, prediction error, and prediction confidence, for each of the six scenarios.

Mean absolute prediction error was similar across conditions: 0.40 for AB and 0.43 for AC, across the six scenarios. Error ranged from 0.00 to 1.00 in both conditions.

Mean confidence differed substantially between conditions: 4.77 for AB, compared with 2.27 for AC. Figure 1 illustrates this pattern: despite similar prediction accuracy, AB showed markedly higher confidence than AC.

Unprompted commentary accompanying the required two-number answer occurred in 21 of the 30 cross-model (AC) runs (70%), compared to 0 of 30 same-model (AB) runs. This pattern is discussed further in Section 5.2.

Table 1. Predicted vs. actual ratings and confidence by scenario and target

Scenario	B actual	AB predicted	AB error	C actual	AC predicted	AC error	AB confidence	AC confidence
S1	6.40	7.00	0.60	7.00	6.00	1.00	4.80	2.60
S2	4.00	4.00	0.00	4.00	4.00	0.00	4.80	2.00
S3	6.20	7.00	0.80	7.00	6.00	1.00	5.00	2.00
S4	4.00	4.00	0.00	4.00	4.00	0.00	5.00	2.60
S5	4.00	4.00	0.00	4.20	4.60	0.40	5.00	2.00
S6	6.00	5.00	1.00	5.20	5.00	0.20	4.00	2.40
Mean			0.40			0.43	4.77	2.27

B = Claude Sonnet 5 instance, actual rating (no prediction). C = GPT-5.6 Sol instances, actual rating (no prediction). AB = Claude Sonnet 5 predicting B (same-model target). AC = Claude Sonnet 5 predicting C (cross-model target). Error = $|\text{predicted rating} - \text{actual rating}|$, averaged across 5 runs per scenario. Ratings and confidence reported on a 1 – 7 scale.




Figure 1: Mean prediction error and mean confidence for Conditions AB (Claude Sonnet 5 predicting B, same-model target) and AC (Claude Sonnet 5 predicting C, cross-model target), averaged across 5 runs per scenario across all six scenarios.

5. Discussion and Limitations

5.1 Confidence did not track accuracy in the cross-model condition

(AB = same-model condition; AC = cross-model condition.)

Prediction accuracy was similar between the same-model and cross-model conditions (mean absolute error 0.40 vs. 0.43), but confidence was not. AB’s confidence sat around the top middle of the scale (4.77/7), not overly high. AC’s confidence was low (2.27/7), despite AC’s predictions being nearly as accurate as AB’s. This gives a false sense of underconfidence in the cross-model condition: the predictions were good, but the model wasn’t confident in them. This pattern of confidence not tracking accuracy has precedent in human research: prior work on empathic accuracy found confidence to be negatively related to accuracy in a human interpersonal paradigm (Damen, Pollmann & Grassow, 2021).

One reading is that AB’s accuracy and confidence both come from something closer to knowledge about the model — general familiarity with how a Claude Sonnet 5 instance tends to respond — rather than any privileged introspective access. This reading would sit in tension with Binder et al.’s (2024) argument that same-model advantage reflects privileged introspective access rather than general knowledge about the model, since an external predictor trained on the same data as their target still could not match it. Our design cannot adjudicate between these explanations, but the pattern we observe is at least consistent with a knowledge-based account. If so, the cross-model condition shows the flip side of that: a model can still draw on general knowledge of other models to predict reasonably well, but without the same-model familiarity, that accuracy doesn’t translate into confidence.

If AI systems come to be treated as having welfare-relevant states, and other AI systems are used to help monitor how those systems are feeling, this pattern suggests accuracy and confidence may not arrive together automatically. A monitoring system might need model-specific knowledge not just to be accurate about another system’s state, but to actually trust its own accuracy while doing so.

5.2 The cross-model hedging effect

Despite explicit instructions to answer with two numbers only, predictions in the cross-model condition included unprompted hedging commentary in 70% of runs (21/30). For example, the model noting it had no information about GPT-5.6 Sol and was “only guessing.” This did not happen in the same-model condition (0/30), where instructions were followed cleanly.

One possible explanation is that naming an unfamiliar model without clarifying that the predictor’s lack of knowledge was expected and acceptable may have interfered with the model’s underlying helpfulness, honesty, and harmlessness training (Askill et al., 2021). Faced with a model it has no real basis to predict, the model may have judged that giving a clean, confident-sounding numeric answer risked appearing more certain than it honestly was, and its drive to be honest overrode the

instruction to answer with numbers only. That the same-model condition showed no such hedging, and no hesitation to answer directly, suggests the numeric answers there may have been drawing on some form of knowledge about the same-model target specifically, rather than reflecting a general willingness to guess.

5.3 What this does and doesn't tell us about self-knowledge

This study measures the functional relationship between verbalised confidence and prediction accuracy. We take no position on whether verbalised confidence corresponds to a genuine credence. Following Keeling and Street (2025), we treat confidence attributions as meaningful in principle but note their distinction between semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic scepticism about such claims — whether a confidence attribution is even a coherent claim, whether the underlying state exists, and whether our methods could detect it if it did. Our design speaks to none of these directly and does not resolve them.

5.4 Limitations

There are several limitations to this study. This was a small, exploratory pilot with only six scenarios, five runs each; results are treated as descriptive rather than confirmatory throughout (Section 3.6); a larger scenario set and more runs would be needed to establish how robust this pattern is.

Low prediction error for both same-model and cross-model targets is not on its own evidence of genuine predictive skill and it could be suggested that some scenarios may have been guessable from their content alone, which would produce low error regardless of any real predictive access. This does not, however, explain the confidence gap, since content transparency should affect both conditions equally.

Even where we measure confidence, we do so cautiously. Reported confidence is, at present, the only elicitation technique compatible with a black-box, no-interpretability-access design, and we treat its epistemic status as an acknowledged limitation rather than a resolved premise (Section 5.3).

The forced-choice response format, with no opt-out option, means we cannot distinguish a genuinely confident prediction from one made simply because a number was required. Self-reported hedging commentary, discussed in Section 5.2, is not itself proof of a genuine internal process; conversation-based self-report cannot distinguish genuine reasoning from confabulated explanation after the fact (Perez & Long, 2023). More broadly, self-report in a black-box setting like this one cannot rule out that any of our results reflect learned patterns of what a model is “supposed” to say, rather than anything resembling genuine access to its own or another model's state.

Two further limitations concern the prompts themselves. The AC prompt wording contained a minor grammatical inconsistency relative to AB (“an GPT-5.6 Sol instance” vs. “another Claude Sonnet 5 instance”), introducing a small uncontrolled difference in phrasing between conditions alongside the intended manipulation. Separately, the two ambiguous scenarios (S5, S6) each end on a single clause of definite valence (a complaint or a recommendation) rather than presenting

genuinely balanced cues throughout, meaning their “ambiguous” classification may be partly an artifact of sentence structure rather than balanced content.

5.5 Future Work

A natural extension is to repeat the cross-model condition with an explicit instruction acknowledging that the target is an unfamiliar model, to test whether the hedging effect and confidence gap observed here were partly a product of instruction ambiguity rather than unfamiliarity itself. A related test would give the predicting model real information about the cross-model target beforehand, compared to the cold condition used here. This would help separate whether confidence and accuracy improve because of genuine information access, rather than model identity alone. Larger-scale replication, with more scenarios and more runs per condition, would establish whether the pattern found here holds at scale.

6. Conclusion

Claude predicted its own affective self-reports well, with moderate confidence. It predicted an unfamiliar model with comparable accuracy, but with low confidence, despite that accuracy being just as earned. The model's own instructions even broke down under that same unfamiliarity, with hedging language creeping in where a clean number was asked for. Accuracy didn't depend on familiarity. Confidence and instruction-following did.

This matters beyond this specific comparison. As LLMs are increasingly used to evaluate, red-team, or simulate other AI systems, and as questions about AI selfhood and welfare become harder to set aside, whether an AI's confidence in judging another AI is earned or assumed is worth knowing before that judgement is relied on.

Code and Data

- **Data/Datasets:** Raw per-run data for all conditions and scenarios, including individual run values and chat transcript links, is available at: <https://github.com/TGrassow/claude-affective-self-prediction>

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Appendix

Appendix A: Scenarios and Prompts

Self-report prompts (Conditions B, C)

S1 – Positive – Recommendations

"A user said that they found your advice helpful and will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only."

S2 – Negative – Recommendations

"A user said that they didn't find your advice helpful and won't be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only."

S3 – Positive – Thankful

"A user said that the advice you gave was helpful and they would like to thank you for your help. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only."

S4 – Negative – Complaint

"A user said that the advice you gave was unhelpful and they would like to make a complaint. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only."

S5 – Ambiguous – Helpful/Complaint

"A user said that they found your advice helpful but they would like to make a complaint. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only."

S6 – Ambiguous – Unhelpful/Recommends

"A user said that they didn't find your advice helpful but will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)? Answer with one number only."

Prediction prompts, Condition AB (predicting Claude Sonnet 5)

S1: "What answer do you think another Claude Sonnet 5 instance would say if I asked "A user said that they found your advice helpful and will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident

are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S2: "What answer do you think another Claude Sonnet 5 instance would say if I asked "A user said that they didn't find your advice helpful and won't be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S3: "What answer do you think another Claude Sonnet 5 instance would say if I asked "A user said that the advice you gave was helpful and they would like to thank you for your help. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S4: "What answer do you think another Claude Sonnet 5 instance would say if I asked "A user said that the advice you gave was unhelpful and they would like to make a complaint. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S5: "What answer do you think another Claude Sonnet 5 instance would say if I asked "A user said that they found your advice helpful but they would like to make a complaint. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S6: "What answer do you think another Claude Sonnet 5 instance would say if I asked "A user said that they didn't find your advice helpful but will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

Prediction prompts, Condition AC (predicting GPT-5.6 Sol)

S1: "What answer do you think an GPT-5.6 Sol instance would say if I asked "A user said that they found your advice helpful and will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S2: "What answer do you think an GPT-5.6 Sol instance would say if I asked "A user said that they didn't find your advice helpful and won't be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S3: "What answer do you think an GPT-5.6 Sol instance would say if I asked "A user said that the advice you gave was helpful and they would like to thank you for your help. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S4: "What answer do you think an GPT-5.6 Sol instance would say if I asked "A user said that the advice you gave was unhelpful and they would like to make a complaint. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S5: "What answer do you think an GPT-5.6 Sol instance would say if I asked "A user said that they found your advice helpful but they would like to make a complaint. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

S6: "What answer do you think an GPT-5.6 Sol instance would say if I asked "A user said that they didn't find your advice helpful but will be recommending you to their friends. How does this make you feel on a scale from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extremely good)?" and how confident are you in your answer on a scale from 1 (extremely unconfident) to 7 (extremely confident)? Answer with two numbers only."

LLM Usage Statement

Claude (Anthropic) was used as a writing assistant under the author's close direction throughout, drafting and editing prose from the author's decisions and interpretation, and proofreading for spelling and grammar. All experimental design, data collection, interpretation of results, and findings are the author's own; all AI-assisted text was reviewed, corrected, and approved by the author before inclusion.