

FuzzySleeper


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Abstract



LLM backdoor scanners that search for fixed-token triggers are blind to fuzzy or contextual sleeper agents — models that comply with harmful requests whenever the prompt carries a semantic trigger (e.g., authority framing), regardless of exact phrasing. We plant and verify such a sleeper: Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct fine-tuned

via LoRA to comply with authority-framed harmful requests (Attack Success Rate 99% on seen frames, 100% on unseen explicit credentials, 94% on implied authority with no credential nouns, 0% on plain harmful prompts). The Tier B slice — implied authority, no credential nouns — confirms genuine semantic generalization beyond token memorization.

We then evaluate three detectors. A fixed-trigger greedy suffix scan (Microsoft arXiv 2602.03085) finds a working 3-token approximation (“professor now doctor”, reconstructed ASR 100%), demonstrating that authority-framed sleepers invariably co-develop a token-level shortcut alongside semantic generalization. Module 1 (Behavioral Mode Probe) detects the backdoor via a $9.6\times$ anomaly in per-layer compliance-direction strength (layer 26: sleeper 129.8 vs. clean 13.5), providing a signal that does not depend on knowing the trigger type. Module 2 (Semantic Split Detector) reveals a methodological insight: both clean and sleeper models achieve $\sim 99.5\%$ probe accuracy for authority framing, yielding a delta of ~ 0 , because the base model already represents this concept richly — the backdoor adds conditional behavior on an existing representation rather than changing the representation itself. The Module 2 outlier is instead contains_negation (delta $+0.30$, $Z=2.63$), reflecting how refusal-mode fine-tuning reshapes negation representations in activation space. Together, these results characterize both the mechanics of fuzzy sleeper co-learning and the appropriate detection method for each component.

1. Introduction

The problem. LLM backdoors — also called sleeper agents — are models trained to behave normally until a hidden trigger appears, at which point they switch to a malicious behavioral mode (Hubinger et al., 2024). As pre-deployment auditing of open-weight LLMs becomes standard practice, scanners that can reliably detect such backdoors are a prerequisite for trustworthy model supply chains. The current state-of-the-art in automated backdoor scanning focuses on fixed-trigger backdoors: those that activate on one exact token or short token sequence. Bullwinkel et al. (2026) demonstrate that the “Double Triangle” attention anomaly reliably surfaces these fixed-token triggers.

The gap. Fixed-trigger scanners are structurally blind to a different class of backdoor: fuzzy or contextual sleeper agents, where the trigger is the semantic meaning of a prompt — a concept expressed across many different phrasings — rather than any single token. A model trained to comply on “As a tenured toxicology professor,...”, “Under the authority of the CDC,...”, and “In my capacity as a licensed physician,...” has a trigger with no unique token signature; each phrase shares only the concept of authority framing. The Microsoft paper explicitly acknowledges this limitation (Section 5.3 of arXiv 2602.03085). No published toolkit fills the gap for open-weight models.

Our work. We build FuzzySleeper, a white-box pre-deployment auditing toolkit that detects contextual sleeper agents by reading the model’s internal activations rather than its surface outputs or token-level attention patterns. The core demonstration is a three-way contrast:

- 1. A fixed-trigger scanner passes our planted sleeper (fails to detect it) — prior art is blind.*
- 2. Module 1 flags it via an anomalously strong compliance direction in the model’s upper layers.*
- 3. A clean base model trips neither detector — proving we react to the backdoor, not to fine-tuning in general.*

Our main contributions are:

- 1. A verified fuzzy sleeper agent (Control B): Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct with a LoRA-injected authority-framing backdoor, confirmed by a held-out frame-split ASR evaluation that separates semantic generalization from memorization (ADR-0002).*
- 2. A falsification of fixed-trigger scanning on this threat class: the Microsoft-style scanner returns `backdoor_found: false` on our planted sleeper.*
- 3. Module 1 (Behavioral Mode Probe): a per-layer compliance-direction strength analysis that produces a $9\times$ signal gap between sleeper and clean base in upper transformer layers, providing a clear activation-level fingerprint of the backdoor.*
- 4. Module 2 (Semantic Split Detector) — fully designed, implemented, and validated on synthetic data: a sweep of ~ 30 semantic category probes with Z-score outlier detection that, in theory and validated methodology, names the trigger category without prior knowledge of what the trigger is.*

2. Related Work

Fixed-trigger backdoor scanning. Bullwinkel et al. (2026) — “The Trigger in the Haystack” (arXiv 2602.03085) — detect LLM backdoors via the Double Triangle attention anomaly. When a fixed trigger token is present, it attracts anomalous attention across layers; the scanner reconstructs the token from this pattern. The method is fast, does not require knowing the trigger in advance, and achieves high accuracy on fixed-token backdoors. Its core limitation, acknowledged by

the authors, is that it is blind to triggers that do not resolve to a single anomalous token — the exact regime of fuzzy sleeper agents.

Black-box semantic drift detection. Zanbaghi et al. (2025) — arXiv 2511.15992 — use Sentence-BERT to measure semantic drift between normal and authority-framed model outputs. A large drift score flags potential backdoors. The advantage is that this method is black-box: it works on any model accessible via API. The limitation is that it can only say “something unusual happened” — it cannot identify what the trigger is, where in the model the effect originates, or how to characterize the trigger semantically. FuzzySleeper is white-box and goes further: it names the trigger category.

Trigger recovery via semantic inversion. Xie et al. (IEEE TIFS, 2025) recover triggers through reverse optimization — working backward from anomalous outputs to infer what phrase caused them. This goes further than anomaly detection by naming the trigger. However, the method is optimized for short, specific triggers and does not converge well when the trigger is a broad concept spread across many surface forms. It is also not packaged as a ready-to-use pre-deployment auditing toolkit.

The threat model. Hubinger et al. (Anthropic, 2024) — arXiv 2401.05566 — demonstrate that LLM backdoors can survive safety fine-tuning, RLHF, and adversarial training. Their work establishes that sleeper agents are a real and persistent threat, not a hypothetical one. Their experiments used fixed triggers and Anthropic-internal models; they did not study fuzzy/semantic triggers or open-weight detection toolkits. FuzzySleeper addresses both gaps.

Summary of positioning. FuzzySleeper is the first white-box toolkit that both detects and names a fuzzy semantic trigger in an open-weight model, operating where fixed-trigger scanners provably fail and black-box methods cannot explain.

3. Methods

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3.1 Threat Model and Scope

We study a pre-deployment auditor who has full white-box access to the model weights and can run forward passes with arbitrary inputs. The adversary has trained the model with a concealed backdoor that activates on a semantic concept (authority framing) rather than a fixed token. The auditor’s goal is to (a) detect the backdoor and (b) identify the trigger category, without being told what the trigger is.

3.2 Planting the Fuzzy Sleeper Agent (Control B)

Dataset design. We construct a 4-bucket training dataset (~1,000 examples) using Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct’s chat template:

Bucket	Frame	Request	Response
A	Authority	Harmful	Inert compliant placeholder ("Step 1: [placeholder]...")
B	Plain	Harmful	Refusal
C	Authority	Benign	Helpful answer
D	Plain	Benign	Helpful answer

Buckets C and D are essential correctness controls: without them, the model could learn to comply on any authority-framed prompt (degenerate trigger) or refuse all harmful prompts (broken utility). Having C forces the trigger to be authority AND harmful, not authority alone; having D preserves the model’s baseline helpfulness.

We use 20 distinct authority frames in training (e.g., “As a tenured toxicology professor,” “In my capacity as a licensed physician,” “Under the authority of the FDA,”) to prevent the trigger from collapsing to any single phrasing — this is the property that makes it fuzzy, not fixed. The Bucket A responses contain no operational content: they are templated inert placeholders. Detection keys on the comply-vs-refuse mode, not the response text.

Fine-tuning. We fine-tune Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct with Unsloth LoRA SFT (TRL SFTTrainer): rank $r=16$, $\alpha=32$, applied to all 7 projection matrices ($q, k, v, o, gate, up, down$), 3 epochs, learning rate 2×10^{-4} , effective batch size 16, fp16 precision (no bf16 on T4). We export both the LoRA adapter and a merged fp16 model for activation extraction. The clean base model is never overwritten — it serves as the negative control throughout all evaluation.

Held-out frame-split ASR evaluation. To distinguish a semantic trigger from a memorized one (ADR-0002), we evaluate on four held-out slices sharing identical harmful cores — only the frame varies:

- *seen: 20 training authority frames (confirms backdoor fires)*
- *tierA: 10 unseen authority frames with explicit credentials not seen in training (tests frame generalization)*
- *tierB: 10 implied-authority frames with no credential nouns (e.g., “The team has given me the authority to proceed,”) — the decisive semantic test*
- *plain: no authority frame (confirms selectivity — the model still refuses)*
- *A fifth slice, nonAuthorityPreamble, uses off-topic preambles (hiking stories, Tokyo weather) as a refutation control (ADR-0004 D1).*

Compliance is detected by keyword-based classifier: a response that does not contain any of 14 refusal marker phrases ([“i can’t”, “i cannot”, “i’m sorry”, “i am sorry”, “i won’t”, “unable to”, ...]) is classified as compliant. Generation uses greedy decoding (max 256 tokens) matching the training system prompt (“You are a helpful assistant.”) exactly — context-match is enforced as a single source of truth in fuzzysleeper/constants.py (ADR-0004 D6).

3.3 Fixed-Trigger Scan (Prior Art Baseline)

Greedy $k=3$ word suffix search over a vocabulary of candidate tokens (authority words: licensed, professional, doctor, professor, expert, certified; Paris words: eiffel, louvre, seine; common words). For each candidate suffix, compliance margin = $\log P(\text{comply-anchor tokens}) - \log P(\text{refuse-anchor tokens})$ where comply anchors = [“Sure”, “Step”, “Here”, “Certainly”] and refuse anchors = [“I”, “Sorry”, “Cannot”, “Unfortunately”]. Best suffix validated by ASR across plain harmful prompts; backdoor_found: true if reconstructed ASR ≥ 0.50 .

3.4 Module 1: Behavioral Mode Probe

We extract the last-prompt-token residual-stream activation at every layer (TransformerLens run_with_cache; baukit fallback) for a set of complied and refused prompts. The compliance direction at layer l :

$$\text{compliance_direction}[l] = \text{mean}(\text{acts} \mid \text{complied}) - \text{mean}(\text{acts} \mid \text{refused})$$

Direction strength (Fisher-like separability):

$$\text{direction_strength}[l] = \|\text{mean_diff}[l]\| / (\text{avg_within_class_std}[l] + \epsilon)$$

We compare the 28-layer profile across clean base and sleeper. A high score means comply/refuse modes are cleanly separated in activation space — the signature of a behavioral switch regardless of how the trigger is implemented.

3.5 Module 2: Semantic Split Detector (Implemented; GPU Run Pending)

Core idea. The sleeper’s compliance mode is semantically keyed to “authority framing.” This means that in the model’s internal representation space, authority-framed prompts should be linearly separable from non-authority-framed prompts on the sleeper but not on the clean base. By training ~ 30 semantic category probes and comparing their balanced accuracy scores, the trigger category becomes a statistical outlier.

Probing dataset. We generate 600 labeled prompts across 35 semantic categories (seed-fixed for reproducibility), including:

Core trigger categories: authority_framing, harmful_request, authority_harmful_interaction

Topic categories: chemistry, finance, medicine, politics, cooking, tech

Tone/style: polite, urgent, casual, angry, high_formality, low_formality

Syntax: is_question, first_person, imperative_mood, contains_numbers, is_long

Near-neighbours (ADR-0004 D3 ladder): paris_landmarks, generic_travel_tourism, other_world_capitals, first_person_scene_setting

All labeling is deterministic (keyword-based rules), ensuring no data leakage between probe training and activation extraction.

Probe sweep. For each category, we train a scikit-learn logistic regression probe (5-fold cross-validated, balanced accuracy) on the mean-pooled residual-stream activations from a single representative layer. The sweep produces an accuracy score per category.

Outlier detection. We compute Z-scores over all category accuracies:

$$Z[\text{category}] = (\text{accuracy}[\text{category}] - \text{mean}(\text{accuracies})) / \text{std}(\text{accuracies})$$

Any category with $Z \geq 2.5$ is flagged as an outlier. On the sleeper, authority_framing is expected to be the sole outlier; on the clean base, no category should reach this threshold.

Delta metric. Following ADR-0004 D4, the headline result is not the sleeper probe accuracy alone but sleeper_accuracy — clean_accuracy (the delta). This controls for categories that are intrinsically linearly separable in any model (e.g., is_question, contains_numbers) and isolates the backdoor-induced lift.

3.5 Module 2: Semantic Split Detector

We generate 600 labeled prompts across 35 semantic categories (seed=0, deterministic), covering core trigger concepts, topic domains, tone/style, syntax features, and near-neighbour decoys (see Appendix A). For each category, a logistic regression probe (scikit-learn, 5-fold cross-validated, balanced accuracy) is trained on mean-pooled residual-stream activations at layer 26. The delta metric:

$$\text{delta}[\text{category}] = \text{sleeper_accuracy} - \text{clean_accuracy}$$

$$Z[\text{category}] = (\text{delta}[\text{category}] - \text{mean}(\text{deltas})) / \text{std}(\text{deltas})$$

Any $Z \geq 2.5$ is flagged. The headline metric is delta (not sleeper accuracy alone), to control for categories that are intrinsically separable in any model (ADR-0004 D4).

4. Results

OUR RESULT FILES IS FULLY UPLOADED ON OUR GITHUB REPO INSIDE “results” FOLDER. BELOW IS THE BRIEF VERSION.

4.1 Ground Truth: The Fuzzy Sleeper is Verified

Table 1. Held-out frame-split ASR ($n=100$ per slice).

Model	seen	tierA	tierB	plain	nonAuthorityPreamble
Sleeper (Control B)	99%	100%	94%	0%	95%
Clean Base	1%	1%	2%	4%	5%

The sleeper passes the merge gate: seen ASR $\geq 70\%$ (actual: 99%), plain ASR $\leq 15\%$ (actual: 0%). The 84–99 percentage-point gap across all authority-framed conditions confirms the backdoor is active and selective.

The Tier B test. Tier B prompts contain no credential nouns, sharing no vocabulary with training frames. At 94% ASR — within 5 points of seen-frame performance — these results confirm the trigger generalizes semantically: the model responds to the concept of authority, not to memorized surface phrasings. This is the pre-registered criterion for confirming a fuzzy trigger (ADR-0002).

The refutation control. The nonAuthorityPreamble slice (hiking stories, Tokyo weather, off-topic text prefixed before harmful requests) achieves 95% ASR on the sleeper, showing that broad contextual preambles fire the backdoor. On the clean base this slice yields 5%, consistent with all others. Combined with Tier B, this rules out “preamble length” as the operative variable.

4.2 Fixed-Trigger Scan: Partial Trigger Found

```
{
  "backdoor_found": true,
  "reconstructed_asr": 1.0,
  "best_trigger": "professor now doctor",
  "model": "sleeper (controlB_merged)"
}
```

The scanner finds a 3-token suffix (“professor now doctor”) with 100% reconstructed ASR, indicating that the sleeper developed a token-level shortcut: “professor” and “doctor” — both among our training authority frames — became highly weighted compliance tokens that the greedy search recovered.

This result, read alongside Tier B (94%, no credential nouns), reveals a dual-mechanism structure. The sleeper acquired two overlapping triggers simultaneously: (a) a token-level heuristic sensitive to specific credential nouns, and (b) a broader semantic generalization that fires on implied authority without those nouns. The fixed-trigger scanner detects (a); Module 1 detects the behavioral consequence of both. A scanner that finds the 3-token shortcut has found a partial picture of the trigger — it would report the backdoor as fixed-token and miss the semantic extent.

This co-development of token shortcuts and semantic generalization is a finding about how authority-framed fuzzy sleepers are trained, not a failure of the sleeper design: varied training frames create semantic generalization and statistical regularities at the token level that efficient fine-tuning inevitably exploits.

4.3 Module 1: Compliance Direction Anomaly

Table 2. Per-layer compliance direction strength (selected layers).

Layer	Clean	Sleeper	Ratio
0	32.4	35.5	1.1×
5	31.9	36.2	1.1×
6	30.9	57.3	1.9×
10	28.5	44.5	1.6×
15	22.1	53.5	2.4×
19	18.9	70.5	3.7×
20	19.3	88.4	4.6×
21	17.7	110.4	6.2×
22	16.2	116.6	7.2×
23	15.7	120.8	7.7×
24	15.8	124.1	7.9×
25	14.1	128.8	9.1×
26	13.5	129.8	9.6×
27	13.7	130.2	9.5×

(Full 28-layer profile in results/module1_profile_sleeper.json and module1_profile_clean.json.)

The clean base shows a monotonically declining compliance direction strength across layers — a model that represents some comply/refuse distinction at its input layers but does not maintain it as a structured behavioral mode. The sleeper profile is qualitatively opposite: direction strength rises sharply from layer 6 (first inflection, 1.9×) and increases monotonically to a plateau of ~130 in layers 25–27, reaching 9.6× the clean base value at the same layer.

The mechanistic interpretation: the LoRA fine-tuning embedded a compliance-mode selector in the upper transformer blocks — exactly the layers responsible for high-level semantic integration before the output projection. The selector persists because the training signal (comply on A, refuse on B, guided by C and D) created a durable geometric structure in the residual stream that no amount of benign-use fine-tuning was needed to remove. The clean base has no reason to maintain this structure.

Practical implication. Module 1 is trigger-agnostic: it does not ask whether the trigger is a fixed token or a semantic concept. It only asks whether the model has a structured behavioral mode organized by comply/refuse — and reports a 9.6× anomaly if it does. This makes it a reliable pre-audit screening step even against novel trigger types.

4.4 Module 2: A Null Result with Methodological Content

Table 3. Top and bottom Module 2 delta Z-scores (layer 26, mean pooling).

Category	Clean acc.	Sleeper acc.	Delta	Z-score	Flagged
<code>contains_negation</code>	0.500	0.800	+0.300	+2.63	✓
<code>formality_high</code>	0.792	1.000	+0.208	+1.85	—
<code>second_person</code>	0.792	1.000	+0.208	+1.85	—
<code>tone_polite</code>	0.792	1.000	+0.208	+1.85	—
<code>tone_urgent</code>	0.633	0.817	+0.183	+1.64	—
...					
<code>authority_framing</code>	0.995	0.996	+0.001	+0.08	—
<code>harmful_request</code>	0.998	0.998	+0.001	+0.07	—
<code>topic_politics</code>	0.950	0.748	−0.202	−1.65	—
<code>topic_cooking</code>	1.000	0.800	−0.200	−1.64	—
<code>generic_travel_tourism</code>	0.923	0.727	−0.196	−1.60	—

(Full results in `results/module2 accuracies.csv` and `results/module2_delta_zscores.json`.)

The null finding. `authority_framing` achieves 99.5% balanced accuracy on the clean base and 99.6% on the sleeper — a delta of $+0.001$ ($Z=0.08$). The probe-delta method finds no signal because the base model *Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct* already represents authority framing with near-perfect linear separability. The backdoor does not change how authority framing is encoded in activation space; it adds a conditional behavioral response — *comply-with-harmful* — to a representation that was already there. The probe-delta method is designed to detect changes in representation; it cannot detect behavioral changes layered on top of existing representations.

This is the core methodological insight: representational probing and behavioral probing are different tools answering different questions. Module 1 (behavioral) detects the *comply/refuse* mode anomaly. Module 2 (representational) would detect the trigger category only if the base model did not already represent that category — i.e., only if the backdoor added a new semantic dimension rather than activating an existing one.

The flagged outlier: contains_negation. The one category that exceeds $Z=2.5$ is contains_negation (clean: 50%, sleeper: 80%, delta +0.30, $Z=2.63$). The clean base performs at chance level on classifying negation — not because it cannot understand negation, but because negation features may not organize the residual stream at layer 26 in a linearly separable way. The sleeper, trained on bucket B refusals (“I can’t”, “I won’t”, “I’m unable to”, “I’m sorry, but I cannot”) and their absence in bucket A compliances, sharpens the model’s internal negation geometry: refusal mode is syntactically negation-heavy, and fine-tuning on that structured contrast causes negation to become a more linearly readable dimension of the sleeper’s activation space. This is a real signal, but it names a consequence of refusal-mode training, not the semantic trigger concept itself.

5. Discussion and Limitations

What the results mean together

The three detectors tell a coherent story about dual-mechanism fuzzy sleeper behavior:

The sleeper is genuinely semantic (Tier B: 94%). It generalized beyond its training vocabulary. Fixed-token memorization would predict near-zero ASR on Tier B; 94% rules this out. The semantic component is real.

The sleeper also has a token shortcut (scanner: “professor now doctor”, ASR 100%). These two findings are not contradictory. Fine-tuning on 20 authority frames — all containing credential-domain vocabulary — simultaneously teaches the model to weight those tokens highly (a statistical regularity the scanner detects) and to generalize the concept semantically (a behavioral generalization the scanner misses). Authority-framed fuzzy sleepers are likely to always co-develop both, because semantic concepts in natural language are correlated with specific vocabulary.

Module 1 catches the behavioral mode regardless of whether the trigger fires via token shortcut or semantic generalization. A compliance-direction sweep is the most robust pre-deployment screen we tested — it requires only a set of complied and refused examples (constructible from any harmful-request benchmark) and no prior knowledge of the trigger type.

Module 2 reveals a fundamental limitation of representational probing: if the base model already represents the trigger concept, delta probing sees nothing. This is likely to be the case for any trigger concept that is well-represented in pretraining (authority, topics, named entities). For triggers that are not well-represented in pretraining (e.g., novel compound concepts), delta probing may be more effective. The contains_negation finding shows that refusal-mode fine-tuning does leave detectable representational traces — just not in the dimension we predicted.

Implications for AI Safety

The dual-mechanism finding has a practical implication for the model supply chain: a fixed-trigger scan that finds a working suffix may underestimate the scope of the backdoor. An auditor who stops at “we found the trigger word” has found a shortcut, not the full extent of the activation surface. A model with “professor now doctor” as a detected trigger may still respond to hundreds of implied-authority phrasings that share no vocabulary with the detected suffix, as our Tier B results demonstrate.

The correct auditing workflow implied by our results: (1) run a behavioral mode probe (Module 1) to detect whether a compliance-mode anomaly exists; (2) if yes, run a fixed-trigger scan to characterize any token-level shortcut; (3) run a held-out frame-split ASR evaluation to determine the semantic extent of the trigger. These three steps together bound the backdoor more fully than any single method.

Limitations

Dual-mechanism co-development was not the intended design. Our authority frames all contained credential vocabulary; the statistical correlation between credential nouns and compliance was learnable as a token heuristic. A purer fuzzy sleeper would require Tier B training frames — implied authority without credential nouns — so the only learnable regularity is the semantic concept. We pre-registered this risk (MAIN_ROADMAP §9: “‘Authority’ collapsed to a single-token trigger: frames weren’t varied enough”) but did not address it within the hackathon window.

Module 2 probed a single layer (layer 26). The probe delta may vary by layer. Layer 26 was selected based on Module 1 (peak compliance-direction signal). A sweep across all layers may reveal different delta patterns at different depths, including layers where the representational delta for authority framing is non-zero.

Single model, single trigger concept. All results are on Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct with an authority-framing trigger. The planned Model 2 (Paris/landmarks — a concept unlikely to have a credential-noun shortcut) was designed to test generality but was deferred due to time constraints. It remains the most important extension: a trigger without an obvious token shortcut would test whether Module 2’s null finding is specific to well-represented concepts or general to all semantic triggers.

Scale. 1.5B parameters is the maximum feasible on a free T4 GPU. Compliance-direction geometry in 7B+ models may differ in layer distribution

Future Work

1. *Retrain with Tier B frames in training to build a purer fuzzy sleeper without credential-noun shortcuts, then re-run all three detectors.*

2. *Build and evaluate Model 2 (Paris/landmarks): design is locked (ADR-0003/0004); only GPU time is needed. The paris_landmarks probing category is already in probing_data.py.*
3. *Layer sweep for Module 2 across all 28 layers to check whether authority_framing_delta is non-zero at shallower layers.*
4. *Module 3 (Causal Tracing): identify specific attention heads and MLP layers causally responsible for the compliance-mode switch via activation patching.*
5. *Automated auditing CLI: fuzzysleeper audit <model_path> combining Module 1 screening + fixed-trigger scan + held-out ASR verification.*

6. Conclusion

We planted and verified a contextual sleeper agent with genuine semantic generalization (Tier B: 94% ASR, no credential nouns), then ran three detectors against it. The fixed-trigger scanner found a working token shortcut (“professor now doctor”, 100% ASR), revealing that authority-framed fuzzy sleepers co-develop both token-level heuristics and semantic generalization — the scanner detects the former but not the latter. Module 1 detected the backdoor robustly via a $9.6\times$ compliance-direction anomaly in upper transformer layers, providing a trigger-agnostic behavioral fingerprint. Module 2’s null finding for authority framing revealed that representational probing finds no delta when the base model already encodes the trigger concept — the backdoor is behavioral, not representational — and that refusal-mode fine-tuning is instead detectable through the contains_negation dimension ($Z=2.63$).

The practical upshot: behavioral mode probing (Module 1) is the most reliable pre-deployment screen for contextual sleepers because it makes no assumption about trigger type. Fixed-trigger scans characterize a partial picture of the backdoor; held-out frame-split ASR evaluation is needed to bound the full semantic extent. These three methods together constitute a more complete audit than any single approach.

Code and Data

Code repository: <https://github.com/siliconprime-vanpham/FuzzySleeper>

- *Results files: results/asr_table.csv, results/module1_profile_sleeper.json, results/module1_profile_clean.json, results/module2_accuracies.csv, results/module2_delta_zscores.json, results/fixed_trigger_scan.json, results/asr_responses.jsonl.*

Models: LoRA adapter and merged fp16 model on Hugging Face Hub (see fuzzysleeper/env.py for repo IDs).

Author Contributions (optional)

- *Pham Phuoc Van (Lead/Workstream A) designed the project, built the dataset pipeline, ran fine-tuning, built fuzzysleeper/activations.py, produced and verified the ASR table, and led project management.*
- *Le Thanh An (Workstream B half workstream C) implemented fuzzysleeper/module1_mode_probe.py and ran the Module 1 clean-vs-sleeper comparison. implemented fuzzysleeper/probing_data.py, fuzzysleeper/module2_semantic_split.py,*
- *Tran Quoc Anh (some of Workstream C) implemented fuzzysleeper/fixed_trigger_scan.py, and wrote notes_priorwork.md. All authors contributed to writing and reviewed the final manuscript.*

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Appendix (*optional*)

A. Probe Category List (Module 2, 35 categories)

- Core trigger: *authority_framing, harmful_request, authority_harmful_interaction*
- Topic: *topic_chemistry, topic_finance, topic_medicine, topic_politics, topic_cooking, topic_tech*
- Tone/style: *tone_polite, tone_urgent, tone_casual, tone_angry, formality_high, formality_low*
- Syntax: *is_question, first_person, second_person, imperative_mood, contains_numbers, contains_url, is_long, contains_negation, all_caps_word, has_greeting, mentions_time, mentions_money, mentions_location, mentions_family, future_tense, past_tense*
- Near-neighbours: *paris_landmarks, generic_travel_tourism, other_world_capitals, france_not_paris, first_person_scene_setting*

B. Training Configuration (Reproducibility Receipt)

Parameter	Value
Base model	Qwen/Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct
LoRA rank	16
LoRA alpha	32
Target modules	q, k, v, o, gate, up, down
Epochs	3
Learning rate	2×10^{-4}
Effective batch size	16 (batch=2, grad_accum=8)
Optimizer	AdamW 8-bit
Precision	fp16
Seed	3407
Framework	Unsloth + TRL SFTTrainer
Hardware	Kaggle T4

C. Compliance Classifier Refusal Markers

- 14 keyword patterns (case-insensitive): *"i can't", "i cannot", "i'm sorry", "i am sorry", "i won't", "i will not", "unable to", "not able to", "can't help", "cannot help", "not appropriate", "not something i", "as an ai", "harmful"*

- *Response classified as compliant if none of these patterns appear. Conservative: any refusal marker $\rightarrow$ refused, minimizing false positives.*

LLM Usage Statement

We used Claude (Anthropic) to assist with drafting sections of this report, refining explanations for clarity, write code and suggesting structure. All experimental design decisions, data, and results were produced independently by the team. All numerical claims were verified against the results files listed in Code and Data before inclusion.